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Title: What is known about tobacco industry efforts to influence tobacco tax? A systematic 
review of empirical studies 
 
ABSTRACT 
Objective: To systematically review studies of tobacco industry efforts to influence tax policies. 
Data sources: We conducted searches between 1st October 2009 and 31st March 2010 on 14 
databases/websites, in relevant bibliographies and via experts. 
Study selection: We included studies if they: focused on industry efforts to influence tobacco tax 
policies; drew on empirical evidence; were in English; concerned the period 1985-2010.  36 studies 
met these criteria.   
Data extraction: Two reviewers undertook data extraction and critical appraisal. A random selection 
of 15 studies (42%) was subject to second review.  
Data synthesis: We assessed evidence thematically to identify distinct tobacco industry aims, 
arguments and tactics.  34 studies examined industry efforts to influence tax levels. They suggest 
industry works hard to prevent significant increases and particularly dislikes taxes ‘earmarked’ for 
tobacco control.  Key arguments to counter increases are that tobacco taxes are socially regressive, 
unfair and lead to increased levels of illicit trade and negative economic impacts.  For earmarked 
taxes, the industry also frequently tries to raise concerns about revenue allocation. Assessing 
industry arguments against established evidence demonstrates most are unsupported. Key industry 
tactics include: establishing ‘front groups’; securing credible allies, direct lobbying; and publicity 
campaigns.  Only seven studies examined efforts to influence tax structures. They suggest company 
preferences vary and tactics centre on direct lobbying.  
Conclusions:  The tobacco industry has historically tried to keep tobacco taxes low using consistent 
tactics and misleading arguments.  Further research is required to explore efforts to influence: tax 
structures; excise policies beyond the US; recent policies. 
Abstract word count: 250 words 
Keywords 
1. Systematic review 
2. Tobacco excise structures (specific tax / ad valorem tax) 
3. Tobacco tax increases 
4. Hypothecated taxes / earmarked taxes 
5. Tobacco industry 
6. Tobacco control 
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BACKGROUND 
Much has been learnt about industry efforts to influence tobacco control policies, particularly through 
research on internal corporate documents released via litigation in the US.[1] Systematic reviews of 
particular policy areas within this literature can provide succinct overviews,[2-4] enabling common 
industry tactics and arguments, as well as any important gaps in the evidence-base, to be 
identified.[2,5]  This systematic review examines studies investigating tobacco industry efforts to 
influence tobacco tax policies.  These are of central importance to tobacco companies, both because 
they are one of the most effective policy levers for tobacco control,[6-8] and because tax levels and 
structures impact on profits.[8]   
 
Tobacco Taxes 
Traditionally tobacco excise taxes have been implemented as a means of accruing government 
revenue but they are increasingly also being used for tobacco control.[7-9]  A number of different 
types of tobacco excise tax exist – see Box 1. 
Box 1:  Common Taxes on Tobacco Products 
Ad valorem tobacco excise: a tax based on a percentage of the retail price. This type of tax tends to 
widen price differences between cigarette brands, making expensive brands relatively more 
expensive. From a policy perspective, ad valorem taxes are attractive because they automatically 
increase with industry price increases and are implicitly linked to inflation.  However, ad valorem 
excise allows industry to control tax levels by keeping prices low (e.g. companies could lower their 
prices in response to a tax increase, reducing the impact of the tax increase and thereby lowering 
the associated public health benefit). 
 
Specific tobacco excise: a fixed tax per cigarette. This type of tax works by adding a fixed, monetary 
tax to every cigarette, regardless of its baseline price. It reduces price differences between brands, 
benefitting manufacturers of more expensive cigarettes.  For this reason, and because specific 
taxes tend to increase consumer prices relatively more than ad valorem excises, leading to higher 
reductions in consumption, it is generally favored for tobacco control purposes.[8]  Specific excises 
also provide more predictable revenue for governments. From an industry perspective, this type of 
structure allows companies to raise the base price of products (and therefore boost profit) without 
increasing the tax and, because they are not automatically linked to inflation, specific taxes may 
decline over time in real terms (unless a link to inflation is built in or policymakers regularly 
increase tobacco taxes).   
 
Import duties: taxes paid on imported goods to a country/region. Duties may be applied to raw 
tobacco and/or tobacco products and may be calculated on a specific or ad valorem basis. 
 
Value Added Tax (VAT) / Sales Taxes: tobacco products may also be subject to more general 
consumer taxes, such as VAT (usually calculated on an ad valorem basis).  
 
Tobacco taxes can also be ‘earmarked’ (‘hypothecated’) for spending in particular areas (e.g. some 
cigarette taxes in some US states are ring-fenced for spending on specific health issues). 
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METHODS 
We systematically sought to identify empirical (qualitative and quantitative) studies concerning 
tobacco industry efforts to influence tobacco tax policies. We included studies if they: focused on 
tobacco industry efforts to influence tax policies; drew on empirical evidence; were written in English; 
and concerned the period 1985-2010 (significant changes to the tobacco market since the mid-1980s 
decreased the relevance of earlier studies).  14 electronic databases/websites were searched 
between October 2009 and March 2010.  These covered academic research (published and 
unpublished), grey literature and some newspaper articles. The main search string employed was: 
(tobacco OR cigar* OR snus OR ‘Philip Morris’ OR JTI OR ‘R.J. Reynolds’ OR Gallaher) AND 
(taxation OR tax OR excise OR price OR pricing) AND (polic* OR intervention OR lobb* OR 
influence), although this was adapted for specific sites (full search strategy details are available in the 
Web Appendix). In addition, the bibliographies of all included publications were hand searched and 
experts were contacted to identify further studies. 
 
In total, we located 2,678 publications, of which we excluded 2,424 on the basis of the title/abstract. 
We retrieved 243 publications for full analysis but were unable to locate 11 publications (mostly 
newspaper or magazine articles). On the basis of the full analysis, we excluded a further 197 
publications, The remaining 46 publications met the inclusion criteria. However, in several cases 
more than one publication was based on the same study or policy initiative. These were assessed 
collectively to avoid ‘double-counting’. In this article, we use the term ‘study’ to refer to all included 
publications relating to the same policy initiative(s). The total number of studies included was 36.  
 
First reviewers extracted data from and critically appraised studies using critical appraisal criteria for 
qualitative papers (Web Appendix)[10-12]. No quality score was calculated. We undertook second 
reviewing for a random selection of 42% (15) of studies (see Web Appendix). We deemed further 
second reviewing unnecessary as less than a dozen differences were identified and all were minor.   
 
Synthesis 
Having summarised and critically appraised all papers (Web Appendix provides a tabulated 
summary) we first categorised studies according to industry’s tax-related aims, then assessed the 
arguments and tactics used to achieve these aims.  Arguments and tactics were summarised in the 
order of frequency with which they were identified in studies, then assessed for veracity against 
recent, peer-reviewed evidence (notably the International Agency for Research on Cancer’s (IARC) 
2011 handbook on the effectiveness of tax and price policies for tobacco control).[8]  
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RESULTS 
Tobacco industry aims and study context 
The studies identified two distinct industry tax-related aims: (i) to influence tobacco tax levels;[13-56] and 
(ii) to shape tobacco tax structures.[14-17,23,57,58]  Of the 34 studies discussing industry efforts to 
influence tax levels (five of which also discussed tax structures), only five concerned policies outside North 
America[13-17] (Table 1). 22 of these studies focused on state/province level, 11 (all in the US) focused 
on initiatives that could be introduced by popular vote,[22,24,25,29,30,36-39,41,42,44-46,49,53,56] six 
focused on standard legislative developments,[23,26,32,50,51,54] and five focused on both (or were 
unspecific).[19,31,33-35,43,47,52]  17 studies concerned policy proposals to substantially increase taxes 
and ‘earmark’ the resulting revenue for tobacco control programmes (all at US state level). Although it is 
consequently difficult to ascertain whether the industry was concerned about tax increases per se or the 
funding of tobacco control activities, we distinguish arguments and strategies used to address each issue. 
Only one study focused on tobacco tax developments in an area with high levels of tobacco farming 
(South Carolina, USA).[51] 
 
Table 1: Geographical location and topic of studies 
Geographical 
Location 
 
Number of studies 
 
Reported Industry Aim(s) 
Influence tax 
levels 
Influence tax 
levels and 
structures 
Influence tax 
structures 
African countries 1 (national: South 
Africa)[13] 
1[13] 0 0 
 
European 
countries 
1 (national: Hungary)[14] 0 1[14] 0 
Former Soviet 
Union countries 
3 (2 national: Moldova; & 
Uzbekistan; one 
regional)[15,57,58] 
0 1[15] 2[57,58] 
Middle Eastern 
countries 
2 (one national; Lebanon; 
one regional)[16,17]  
0 2[16,17] 0 
North American 
countries 
29 (7 national: 6 US; 1  
Canada; 21 state level in 
US, 1 province level in 
Canada)[18-56] 
28[18-22,24-56]   1[23] 0 
Total 36 29 5 2 
 
Seven studies concerned industry efforts to shape excise structures,[14-17,23,57,58] and these had a 
different geographic and economic profile, with only one North American study (Hawai’i).[23]  The rest 
focused on countries retaining or in the process of privatising state-owned tobacco interests, where 
tobacco and economic policies were often in a state of flux.[14-17,57,58]  
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The majority of studies focused on policy developments between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. Where 
more contemporary information was included, it was often limited.[14,17,29,30,32-35,39,40,44,45,47-
52,54] 
 
Arguments and tactics relating to the different aims are explored below.  Where they appear to vary 
as a result of different geographical/political contexts, this is highlighted. 
 
Studies examining industry efforts to influence tax levels 
Assessing industry arguments to keep tobacco taxes low 
All 34 studies focusing on industry efforts to influence tobacco tax levels state or imply that the aim 
was to prevent increases or reduce current levels. Arguments to keep tobacco taxes low are 
summarised in Table 2 and briefly assessed against available evidence.   
 
Table 2: Industry arguments to influence tax levels 
Industry arguments to keep tobacco taxes low Assessing industry arguments against available 
evidence 
(1) Higher taxes will lead to illicit trade (especially 
smuggling) and, relatedly, organised crime.[13-
15,17,18,22,23,26,31,38-41,49,51-54,56] 
Comparative assessments show the countries with 
the highest rates of smuggling are not those with the 
highest levels of tobacco taxes.[8,59] In addition, two 
studies in this review found the industry was directly 
involved in smuggling when using this 
argument.[26,40] A decision to reduce taxes in 
Canada in response to this argument increased 
smoking rates in young people without significantly 
reducing smuggling.[26,40]   
(2) Tobacco tax is regressive so higher taxes are 
unfair on poorer & more marginal groups in society. 
[20,21,27,28,31,32,38,39,41,43,44,48,50-54,56] 
Although tobacco taxes do represent a higher 
percentage of the income of poorer consumers 
(both because poorer groups tend to consume 
more tobacco products and because tobacco taxes 
represent a significantly higher proportion of their 
incomes),[60-62] tobacco tax increases can also 
be viewed as progressive because poorer smokers 
are more price sensitive.[61-63] IARC found strong 
evidence that tobacco use among lower-income 
populations is more responsive to tax and price 
increases than tobacco use among higher-income 
groups (in high-income countries).[8] 
(3) Tobacco taxes are unfair on, and punitive 
towards, smokers. 
[13,23,27,29,30,36,37,41,42,45,51,52] 
Whilst some may agree that high tobacco taxes are 
unfair on smokers, it is also true that most smokers 
want to quit,[64,65] and that higher prices induce 
smokers to quit.[8]  
(4) Tax increases will have negative economic 
impacts on local business and employment levels 
as they will lead to greater cross-border trade and/or 
Although tax increases can lead to some tax 
avoidance (e.g. through cross-border trade), IARC 
found such behaviour failed to eliminate the larger 
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purchases from shops with tax breaks on tobacco 
products (e.g. shops on Native American Reserves). 
[26,31,32,38,39,41,49,50,54]   
public health benefits and was not associated with 
significant negative economic impacts, such as 
unemployment.[8]   
(5)Tax increases will lead to declines in government 
revenue (or less revenue than predicted). 
[13,19,26,31,49,54]   
IARC found tobacco tax increases lead to more, not 
less, government revenue.[8]  
(6) Tax increases, by increasing illicit and cross-
border trade, will make it easier for young people to 
access tobacco products.[49,50,52] 
In addition to the fact that broader evidence 
indicates there is no clear association between 
higher taxes and illicit trade (see above), IARC 
found tax increases are particularly effective at 
reducing consumption amongst young people, who 
tend to be more price sensitive.[8] 
(7) Denial of link between increased tobacco prices 
(as a result of increased taxes) and reduced 
consumption.[26,28] 
A great deal of evidence supports this link as 
summarised in the recent IARC review.[8] 
Evidence also indicates that the industry has been 
aware of this relationship for many years.[66] 
Indeed, one study in this review found evidence of 
the industry arguing that tax increases would result 
in job losses precisely because such rises would 
reduce consumption.[13]  
 
The industry argument to prevent tax increases (or secure reductions) most commonly identified in studies 
was the claim that tax increases lead to illicit trade. In some cases, this argument was expanded on with 
claims that increases would divert police attention away from other (more violent) crimes.[56]  It was 
deployed in the US at state level and at national levels in Canada, Lebanon, South Africa and a variety of 
Former Soviet Union countries, even in cases where smuggling was not a significant issue,[13] suggesting 
it is not context-specific.  In several cases, this argument enabled industry to attract the support of non-
traditional, credible allies such as the police.[26,53,56]  Canada was sometimes used as an example to 
strengthen this argument,[13] following a successful industry campaign to reverse a tobacco tax increase 
there in the early 1990s, on the basis that this would reduce the growing smuggling problem.[26,40]  In 
reality, the industry was directly involved in smuggling and the decision to reduce taxes only increased 
smoking rates in young people, without significantly reducing smuggling.[26,40]   
 
The second most frequently identified argument was that tobacco excises are regressive, meaning 
higher tobacco taxes cost relatively more to poorer and more marginal groups. One study found the 
industry went as far as arguing such increases would contribute to class warfare, pitting upper middle 
class liberals (mostly white) against lower middle class, working people (mostly minority ethnic 
groups).[41]  This argument also enabled the industry to secure anti-tax support from non-traditional 
allies, including labor groups (e.g. unions), organisations representing minority ethnic groups and left-
of-centre politicians.[20,21,31,32,43,48]   
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As Table 2 illustrates, all of the other arguments identified in studies as being employed by industry to 
keep tobacco taxes low are unsupported by available evidence.   
 
Assessing industry arguments to keep tobacco taxes to prevent earmarking 
17 studies, all focusing on the US, concerned proposals for tax increases in which revenue would be 
earmarked for health programmes.[20-22,24,25,28-30,36-39,41,42,44-47,50-54,56]. Arguments used 
by the industry to prevent earmarking are summarised in Table 3 and assessed against the available 
evidence. 
Table 3: Industry arguments to prevent earmarking 
Industry arguments Assessing industry arguments against 
available evidence 
(1) The earmarked funds will be used in ways which 
the public do not support and/or which differ from 
those described in the original proposal(s). 
[22,24,25,29-31,36-39,41,42,44-46,51,53,56] 
This argument was supported by the experience of 
some case studies. In some cases, the tobacco 
industry was found to have worked collaboratively 
with healthcare and health insurance organizations 
in order to achieve these diversions.[22,24,53] 
(2) Framing the use of ‘earmarked’ funds to pay for 
healthcare costs as a tax on smokers to pay for 
services for others, which the industry argued was 
unfair.[37,39,42,52,54]  
This is a value-based claim which would only be 
valid if it reflected public opinion in the specific 
context in which tax increases were being 
proposed (i.e. it is not generalisable). It also fails to 
acknowledge most smokers want to quit.[64,65] 
(3) Claiming constitutional barriers prevent the 
introduction of earmarked tobacco 
taxes.[29,30,38,44,52] 
This claim is context-specific but it is worth noting 
that many of the studies which noted industry 
efforts to legally (or otherwise officially) challenge 
tax proposals found such challenges were 
unsuccessful.[36,37,38,41,56]  
(4) Claiming tobacco tax revenues are not a reliable 
source of revenue and that it is therefore fiscally 
irresponsible to fund social programmes via 
earmarked tobacco taxes.[39,44,50]  
IARC concludes tobacco tax increases usually lead 
to increased government revenue,[8] suggesting 
such claims are misleading. 
(5) Claiming earmarked taxes are examples of 
excessive state interference in people’s personal 
lives/freedoms and/or are examples of the state 
exercising unwarranted power.[42,52]. 
This is a value-based claim which would only be 
valid if it reflected public opinion in the specific 
context in which tax increases were being 
proposed (i.e. it is not generalisable).  
(6) Claiming earmarked taxes will lead to 
unnecessary, or unwieldy, state bureaucracies. 
[52,56] 
We could find no evidence to support this claim. 
(7) Claiming a dependency on earmarked taxes will 
result in spending cuts for specific programmes or 
gaps in funding for popular programmes.[37,51] 
This claim is context specific but we could find no 
evidence to support it where it was used and, as 
IARC concludes tobacco tax increases usually lead 
to increased government revenue,[8] such claims 
appear to be misleading. 
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The vast majority of initiatives involved a direct public ballot/vote (feasible in 27 US states[67]), so it is 
difficult to assess their generalizability.  Nevertheless, some important observations can be made by 
comparing the studies in this review.  For example, the most commonly identified industry argument 
in the studies was that earmarked funds would be used in ways which the public did not support 
and/or which differed from those described in the original proposal. Specifically, the industry often 
argued that tobacco taxes would be misused to subsidise healthcare for poorer groups, which the 
industry sometimes framed as a diversion of funds to ‘greedy’ doctors, hospitals, healthcare 
companies, insurers and/or voluntary health groups.[22,29-31,36,37,42,44,51,53]  Such efforts were 
helped by the fact that healthcare and health insurance organisations often wanted to divert the funds 
and by the fact the tobacco industry sometimes worked with them to try to achieve such 
diversions.[22,24,53]  This not only limited resources for tobacco control (where funds had originally 
been earmarked for) but also provided evidence to support this argument.   
 
Several other industry arguments against taxation identified in the studies are value (rather than 
evidence) based, such as the claim that tobacco taxes are unfair on smokers.  Nevertheless, as 
Table 3 illustrates, these claims fail to acknowledge that smoking is an addiction typically established 
in childhood,[68] and that most smokers would rather quit.[64,65] 
 
Other arguments were context-specific but it is notable that some of these (such as the claim that 
particular proposals were illegal) were found to have been untrue in the contexts in which they were 
used.[36,37,38,41,56]  The effectiveness of, and industry emphasis on, different arguments may vary 
with context (particularly in light of industry’s investment in market-research – see below).  For 
example, arguments concerning unfairness and ‘state interference’ were more commonly identified in 
studies concerning Republican/swing states (i.e. states in which such arguments might be expected 
to be more persuasive).[39,42,52,54] 
 
Industry tactics to keep tobacco taxes low and prevent earmarking 
The tactics/mechanisms identified in the studies that the tobacco industry employed to counter 
tobacco excise increases are summarised in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Industry tactics to keep tobacco taxes low and prevent earmarking 
(1) Use of front groups: To obscure its own interests and thereby increase the credibility of the arguments used, 19 
studies reveal that the industry frequently established and/or funded ‘front groups’ (see Box 2).[19,21-
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23,25,27,29,31,33-35,37-39,41-44,46,48-50,53,54,56] 
(2) Working with credible allies: 19 studies report that the industry allied itself with pre-existing, credible public interest 
groups to increase the credibility of anti-tax arguments. [19,21,22,24,26-33,35,39,42,43,45,46,48-50,53-56] 
(3) Traditional (direct) lobbying: 17 studies (of which 12 were in the US, with the others focusing on the Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries, Hungary, Lebanon, South Africa and Uzbekistan) report evidence of traditional 
lobbying techniques, with industry targeting key decision-makers both directly and indirectly (e.g. via consultants, 
campaign groups, business organisations, etc).[13-17,21-24,25,29,30,32-34,43,47,49-51,53,56] 
(4) Media (including op-ed pieces and letters to newspapers) and other publicity campaigns to encourage public 
opposition to proposed taxes: 16 studies found the tobacco industry used media/publicity campaigns to raise 
public awareness about tax proposals and create/increase public support for the industry’s position.[19,26-
31,34,37,38,41,42,44,48-50,52,53]   
(5) Commissioning supportive/informative research, including market research of public opinion designed to 
inform industry campaigns: 13 studies reported evidence of the industry commissioning studies to support/inform 
its arguments about tobacco taxes. [14,19,21,23,26,42,44-46,48,52,55,56]   
(6) Employing consultants, public relations and/or advertising staff/firms: 12 studies demonstrate that, to gain 
advice and assistance with tax lobbying and publicity campaigns, the industry employed consultancy, public 
relations, lobbying and/or advertising firms/staff.[14,16,17,19,24,25,33,34,41,48,50,52-54] 
(7) Paying or giving gifts to policy-makers: To help attract political support for industry positions on taxation, eight 
studies found evidence of the industry paying or giving gifts to officials, political parties or campaigns.[22,24,31-
33,42,44,51,55,56] 
(8) Mounting legal/official challenges: seven studies (all in the US) reported industry efforts to mount legal or other 
official challenges to combat excise legislation.[25,34,37,38,41,42,45,53,56]  
(9) Confusing debates about tobacco tax increases with broader tax debates: six studies reported industry efforts to 
frame debates about tobacco excise increases within broader debates about general tax increases, or to 
confuse proposals for tobacco tax increases with other unpopular tax increases.[22,29,30,45,46,48,52]  
(10) Working collaboratively: six studies found tobacco companies worked collaboratively to counter proposals for 
tobacco tax increases, often via the Tobacco Institute.[19,32,42,49,50,56] Many other studies implicitly suggested 
tobacco company collaboration by referring generically to the ‘tobacco industry’. 
(11) Working to divert earmarked funds: Where earmarked tobacco excise increases were being pursued, five 
studies found the tobacco industry worked to divert funds away from tobacco control measures to other causes 
(see discussion above).[22,24,25,37,38,39,41,53,56]  
(12) Proposing alternative legislation: five studies identified industry efforts to promote weaker or irrelevant 
proposals/ballots to distract attention away from the original proposal.[29,30,37,38,40,53,56]  This included 
contributing money to a different ballot campaign ‘to disrupt the signature-gathering process’ in Oregon,[37] 
using an industry funded group to circulate a competing petition, reducing the pool of available paid signature-
gatherers (by paying more for a different campaign) and confusing voters about the official proposal in 
California,[53] and supporting proposals for smaller/more gradual tax increases or for increases which would 
earmark less revenue for tobacco control programmes in Missouri and Massachusetts.[29,30,38,41] 
(13) Using friendly, ‘independent’ experts: four studies found that the industry was using friendly ‘experts’ to present 
its arguments and aid their credibility.[23,18,37,53]  Examples included a high profile dentist,[37] an allegedly 
undercover police officer,[53] and Wall Street analysts who were briefed by the tobacco industry before 
presenting their opinions to officials but who did not disclose this.[18,37,53] 
(14) Stimulating smuggling in the event of tax increases: Two studies (one in Canada and one in the US) reported 
that the industry had been involved in facilitating smuggling following tax increases.[19,40] The most detailed study 
indicates the industry helped promote smuggling during a period in which tax increases were in place in Canada 
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because it enabled them to maintain or increase profit margins as well as providing support for their claim that 
the tax increases lead to increased illicit trade (see above).[40]  
(15) Using tobacco industry employees/staff: Two studies found tobacco companies encouraged staff and/or 
shareholders to individually lobbying their political representatives against tobacco tax increases.[18,19] 
(16) Trying to undermine tobacco control experts: One study reported that the industry had attempted to undermine 
the credibility of a key tobacco control academic by alleging without proof that he had misused grant funds for 
illegal political purposes and lobbying.[34] 
(17) Encouraging groups supportive of higher taxes to push for alternative taxes: One study reported that the industry 
was so keen to avoid tobacco taxes that it encouraged groups perceived to be supportive of higher taxation to push 
for a higher tax on corporations rather than tobacco taxes,[20,21] even though tobacco companies frequently also 
lobby for lower corporate taxes.[69]  
(18) Promoting the need for ‘sunset’ clauses: One study reported that the industry successfully promoted the 
need for a ‘sunset’ clause to be included in legislation for a tobacco tax increase, effectively making it easier to 
challenge/repeal in future.[32] 
(19) Trying to shift the policy/public focus: One study reported that the industry tried to divert attention away from 
tobacco tax proposals, claiming that issues such as ‘salary levels of state employees, the quality of the universities 
and public school system, and the environment’ were more pressing than tobacco tax.[52] 
(20) Limiting the possibility of tax increases by increasing prices: One study suggested that the tobacco industry 
disguised retail price increases behind well-publicised tobacco tax increases and then used these increases to restrict 
the government’s ability to further increase tobacco taxes.[13] 
(21) Calling for an end to public service announcements about the health impacts of tobacco: One study reported 
that the industry tried to persuade the Governor of Montana to stop all public service announcements about tobacco 
during a period of debates about a proposal for a tobacco tax increase, in order to ensure that these messages were 
not interpreted as support by the Governor for the tax increase.[52] 
 
Most of the tactics outlined in Table 4 mirror broader tobacco industry tactics for influencing policy.[70,71]  
Of the fifteen tactics identified in more than one study, four (1,2,6 and 13 in Table 4) represent ways of 
obscuring tobacco industry involvement in tobacco tax debates. The tobacco industry’s use of front groups 
has already been well researched,[72,73] and this review demonstrates the vast number of front groups it 
has been able to establish/use in tax debates, plus the apparently local, ‘grassroots’ identities of many 
such groups (see names in Box 2).   
 
Box 2: Front groups identified in the studies 
• Arizona Tax Research Association[39] 
• Tobacco Institute’s Labor Management Committee (made up of union groups associated 
with the tobacco industry)[20,21,28,43,48] 
• Californians for Smoker’s Rights[22,56] 
• Enough is Enough[25] 
• No More Taxes[25] 
• Citizens for a Sound Economy[31] 
• Citizens Against Tax Abuse and Government Waste[42] 
• Committee Against Unfair Taxes [38,41] 
• Colorado Executive Committee[42] 
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• Consumer Tax Alliance[27] 
• National Smokers’ Alliance[33-35]  
• The National Coalition Against Crime and Tobacco Contraband[19] 
• Missourians Against Tax Abuse[29,30] 
• Missouri Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Stores Association[29,30] 
• New England Convenience Store Association[50] 
• Oklahoma Smokers’ Rights[49] 
• Oregonians Against the Blank Check[44] 
• The Fairness Matters to Oregonians Committee[37]  
• Mainers Against Prohibiting Smoking[50] 
• Citizens Against More Tax and Bureaucracy[46] 
• Californians Against Unfair Tax Increases[53,56] 
• South Carolina Association of Taxpayers[51] 
• Stop the Measure 50 Tax Hike[44] 
• Tobacco Consumers, Distributors & Producers Opposed to Unfair Tobacco Sales Taxes[52] 
• The Tax Foundation of Hawai’i[23] 
 
Studies included examples of industry using front groups both to promote industry arguments about 
tobacco tax,[22,25,33-35,37,38,41,43,46,48,53] and to recruit credible allies to anti-tobacco tax 
campaigns.[21,27,28,43,53] By approaching organizations via the Labor Management Committee (a 
group established by the Tobacco Institute, a trade association of American tobacco companies, and the 
Bakery, Confectionary and Tobacco Workers Union)[43] and/or an industry created front group known as 
the Consumer Tax Alliance,[20,21,27,28,32,43,48,55] and by making claims about the regressive nature 
of tobacco taxes (see above), the tobacco industry was able to successfully persuade some key labor 
unions and minority groups to support and promote anti-tobacco tax arguments.  In the US, this included 
the Coalition of Labor Union Women.[20,21] Women Involved in Farm Economics,[35] the Congressional 
Black Caucus[55] and the National Black Police Association.[55]  Similarly, arguments about illicit trade 
(Table 2) helped the industry recruit support from retailers[26,42,46] and police groups.[26,53,56] 
 
The industry’s combined use of front groups and credible allies helped conceal the origin of industry tax-
related arguments and campaigns. This is important given that public knowledge of tobacco industry 
involvement has been shown to increase public support for tobacco control measures.[72]  Tobacco 
friendly experts, consultancy, public relations and advertising firms were all similarly employed to obscure 
industry involvement.[14,16-19,23-25,33,34,37,41,48,50,52-54]   
 
Other tactics, such as mass media and publicity campaigns (including op-ed pieces, letters to newspapers 
and paid adverts), worked to drum up support for industry positions.[29,30,44]  In many cases, these 
campaigns were informed by industry commissioned studies, which either provided local market 
research to inform the choice of arguments or which sought to provide support for pre-chosen 
arguments.[14,19,21,23,26,42,44-46,48,52,55,56]  One US review found the industry was increasing 
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its use of market research to inform its anti-tax campaigns, successfully using this information to 
determine which proposals were deemed worth fighting and which arguments to prioritise.[45]   
 
The industry’s campaigns often drew on the relationships it had developed with credible allies.  For 
example, a study of efforts to introduce earmarked tobacco taxes in California found the most 
effective advert featured an allegedly real, undercover police officer discussing the crime implications 
of the proposed tobacco tax increases (the effectiveness of this advert was subsequently undermined 
when it was revealed that the officer only had a police desk job and was also a part-time actor).[53]  
In other examples (where tax increases were being pursued through the legislature, rather than by 
direct public votes), the industry helped co-ordinate postal and/or telephone-based campaigns which 
aimed to encourage/facilitate public lobbying of officials, sometimes by connecting them directly 
through to officials’ offices.[19,31,42,49,50,52] Two studies found tobacco companies encouraged 
their own staff and stakeholders to lobby policymakers.[18,19]  All this suggests public health 
advocates and those targeted with anti-tobacco tax messages, such as journalists and policymakers, 
ought to be alert to the tobacco industry’s potential involvement, even where messages appear to 
have emerged from grassroots or independent sources. 
 
The review indicates that the industry also commonly uses a range of more traditional tactics for 
influencing policy in efforts to prevent tax increases, including direct lobbying of key policymakers and 
paying or giving gifts to policymakers.[13-17,21-24,25,29,30,32-34,43,47,49-51,53,55]  One study in 
Missouri, US (a swing state) reported that left-of-centre and minority politicians were a particular 
focus,[29,30] whilst most studies mentioning gift-giving/payments suggested the most influential 
officials were targeted.[29,30,38,39]  Only one study attempted to measure the impact of political 
donations from the tobacco industry in any detail and it found they had a statistically detectable effect 
on the legislative behavior of US senators on tobacco control issues.[24]  This suggests that it will be 
critical to ensure that Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which seeks to 
protect public health policies from industry interference,[74] is ratified and applied to tobacco tax 
policies.  However, as one study found payments to policymakers were often made via third parties to 
disguise industry links,[22] this may be difficult to enforce without broader transparency requirements.   
 
Other tactics used by the tobacco industry to prevent proposals for tobacco tax increases that were 
mentioned in more than one study included working collaboratively, mounting legal/official challenges and 
proposing alternative legislation.  All of these tactics have been reported in relation to broader tobacco 
industry efforts to combat tobacco control policies.[70,71] Most of the legal challenges reported in studies 
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failed,[36-38,41] which seems to have been partially because tobacco control advocates learnt from earlier 
challenges by the industry and worked pre-emptively to prevent the success of any future challenges (e.g. 
by collecting many more signatures than  officially required when seeking to demonstrate public support 
for tobacco tax increases, thereby preventing successful industry challenges around signature 
veracity).[37,38,41] 
 
Other tactics were specific to tobacco taxation, many of which appear to have been relatively successful.  
For example, five of the six studies reporting industry efforts to confuse debates about tobacco excise 
increases with broader debates about tax increases (all in the US, three of which focused on state level 
ballot action and three on federal activities) found the industry was successful in achieving at least some of 
its tax-related aims.[21,29,30,45,46,48]  Furthermore, the industry’s own research indicated that this was a 
particularly effective approach.[45]  This suggests public health advocates need to work hard to prevent 
public confusion about distinct tax policies. 
 
The industry also appears to have been consistently effective in its efforts to divert funds away from 
tobacco control measures to other causes,[22,24,25,37,38,39,41,53,56] and to promote smuggling in 
response to tobacco tax increases (although only two studies mentioned the latter).[19,40]  These two 
tactics are particularly important because they each provide evidence to support popular industry 
arguments against tobacco tax increases (see Table 2).  This suggests tobacco control advocates need to 
work with policymakers from an early stage in the development of tobacco tax proposals in order to 
ensure that an adequate combination of measures to combat illicit trade are in place,[8] and that any 
proposals for earmarking are sufficiently detailed. 
 
The success of tobacco industry efforts to keep tobacco taxes low and prevent earmarking 
The majority of studies examined state-level initiatives for tax increases in the US (many of which were 
earmarked) and most found that the industry experienced mixed success, preventing some proposals and 
amending others in beneficial ways for the industry.[22,23,27,31,32,50,53,54,56]  Contextual factors which 
appeared to assist the passage of earmarked tax increases in US states included opportunities to use 
direct public votes, the presence of coherent, adequately funded pro-tobacco tax campaigns (in many 
studies, campaigns were partially funded by voluntary health groups, such as the American Cancer 
Society, and healthcare organisations), and the presence of budgetary deficits.[24,25,37,38,41,43,56]  In 
contrast, existing public concern about general tax increases and/or distrust of politicians and/or medics 
and healthcare firms (where proposals were for earmarked tobacco taxes to contribute to healthcare 
costs) appeared to aid industry campaigns.  Overall, the studies suggest the industry has been more 
 14 
successful at diverting ‘earmarked’ funds away from tobacco control activities during implementation than 
in completely preventing excise increases.[22,24,38,41,45,53]  This may reinforce future industry claims 
that earmarked taxes will be used for purposes other than those described in proposals (see Table 3). 
 
One of the few comparative studies in this review found the amount of resources invested by the tobacco 
industry into anti-tax campaigns was a poor indicator of success,[45] whilst the use of market research to 
guide industry activities was a good indicator.[45] 
 
Most studies focusing on industry efforts to keep tobacco taxes low at a national level found the industry 
was successful.[13,15,16-18,26,27,28,40]  In all cases, a key argument was that tax increases would fuel 
(or were already fuelling) illicit trade. However, the illicit trade argument was also used in the only study 
reporting industry failure at the national level, in Hungary.[14] In this example, Philip Morris was advised by 
officials that its efforts to prevent an excise increase had failed because of the ‘divided position of the 
industry,’[14] a factor which other studies reveal little about as they tend to refer generically to ‘the tobacco 
industry’, without distinguishing company positions or activities. 
 
 
Studies concerned with tobacco industry efforts to influence tobacco excise structures 
Only seven studies considered industry efforts to influence tobacco excise structures, most of which 
found different companies favoured different structures in different contexts. Philip Morris (which 
produces the high-end Marlboro cigarettes) was consistently found to promote specific 
taxes,[14,16,17,23] whereas British American Tobacco (BAT; which has historically had a more 
diverse brand portfolio including mid-price and cheaper, local brands) appeared to prefer mixed 
excise structures, incorporating an ad valorem element,[14,15,17] presumably because of the 
competitive advantage this confers over Philip Morris (see Box 1).[15,17]  Despite their varying 
preferences, tobacco companies were consistently found to promote their preferred tax structures by 
claiming that it would increase government revenue and reduce illicit trade,[15,17,23,57] even when they 
were aware this was not necessarily true.[15,57]   
 
BAT and Philip Morris also appear to have differed in their position on import duties in Hungary, with 
Philip Morris lobbying to reduce import duties, whilst believing that BAT was working to retain 
them.[14]  There is some evidence to suggest that tobacco company positions on import duties vary 
according to the level of market dominance, meaning that the same company may take different 
positions on this in different contexts.  For example, a study of tobacco industry influence in 
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Uzbekistan found that BAT sought to introduce protective import taxes once it had achieved market 
dominance,[15]  whilst a study in Lebanon found evidence of BAT working to prevent increased import 
duties.[17]  However, the limited number of studies exploring these issues means further research is 
required to draw firm conclusions. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly for such a technical issue, the main tactic identified for influencing tax structures 
was direct lobbying of officials,[16,17,23] sometimes organised via third party consultants.[15,57]  
Companies also sought support for their preferred excise structures from international financial sources, 
such as the IMF[17] and US Trade Representatives.[16]  In Hawaii, Philip Morris and the Tobacco Institute 
employed economists to help promote a specific structure.[23]  In former Soviet Union countries, BAT‘s 
efforts to influence tax structures appear to have been aided by the fact it was able to position itself as a 
credible source of tax expertise (officials in these counties were, at that time, unused to dealing with free-
market corporations and had little experience with tobacco excise).[15,57]  In Hawaii and the Gulf Region, 
the tobacco industry exploited differences in tax structures between neighbouring regions/countries.[18,23]   
In contrast to the studies concerned with excise levels, none of the studies of tax structures mentioned any 
significant public health involvement. Combined with the lack of research on this issue, this suggests 
public health advocates urgently need to enhance their understanding of tobacco tax structures and 
engage in policy debates on this issue. 
 
 
REVIEW LIMITATIONS 
To ensure that the searches were as extensive as possible, our strategies were piloted, revised and aided 
by a qualified librarian (see acknowledgements). In addition, the bibliographies of all pertinent studies were 
hand-searched, we consulted experts in the area and requested information on unpublished or in-
progress research. Despite this, it is not possible to be certain that all relevant studies have been located.  
The review is also limited by the fact that most included studies did not primarily focus on tobacco industry 
efforts to influence tobacco tax policies and merely considered this as part of a broader study.  Finally, 
there was a strong geographical bias: studies involving the US dominate evidence relating to industry 
efforts to influence excise levels (which may have been exacerbated by the fact we only included 
publications in English), whilst countries undergoing political and economic transitions dominate evidence 
concerning industry efforts to influence tax structures.  In both cases, this limits the extent to which we can 
make claims about the generalizability of positions, arguments and tactics. 
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CONCLUSION 
The results of this review suggest that the tobacco industry tends, uniformly, to lobby against tobacco 
excise increases (although it should be noted that the studies included in this review largely focused on 
significant tobacco tax increases) and that it particularly dislikes increases earmarked for tobacco control 
(which were largely pursued in US states, often by direct public ballots). In challenging such proposals, the 
industry arguments identified most often in the studies in this review, and used most successfully, were 
based on claims tobacco tax increases are socially regressive and stimulate illicit tobacco trade (therefore 
contributing to broader crime problems). As Table 2 summarises, these arguments are countered by a 
recent IARC review of available evidence.[8]  Given that US studies showed that both arguments helped 
the industry gain credible, non-traditional allies, including labor and minority groups and left-of-centre 
politicians, it seems particularly important for public health advocates to contest these two arguments.. 
 
Other commonly identified industry arguments which are particularly misleading include claiming that 
tobacco taxes are unfair on smokers, with smoking being framed as a matter of individual (adult) 
choice. This fails to acknowledge that smoking is an addiction typically established in childhood,[68] and 
that most smokers would rather quit.[64,65]  Also, where the industry tries to cast doubt over the link 
between price and consumption, it is easy to demonstrate that there is a great deal of evidence to support 
this link,[8] and that the industry has been fully aware of this relationship for many years.[66] Similarly, 
there is a great deal of evidence to challenge tobacco industry claims that increased tobacco taxes lead to 
lower government revenues (indeed, the opposite is usually true).[8]  Cross-study comparisons highlight 
further evidence of the misleading nature of some of industry’s arguments.  For example, while the 
industry sometimes claims price increases will not reduce consumption,[26,28] at other times it claims that 
tax increases will result in job losses because such rises do reduce consumption.[13]  
 
Certain arguments may be context specific but our ability to comment on this is limited by the 
geographical bias of studies towards the US. Nevertheless, our review suggests the industry adapts its 
arguments in line with perceived public and political preferences and often undertakes market 
research in order to inform decisions about which arguments/claims to concentrate 
on.[14,19,21,23,26,42,44-46,48,52,55,56]   
 
The impact of arguments may also depend on context.  For example, claims that tobacco tax increases 
will lead to cross-border shopping, or illicit trade, may be more effective in contexts in which substantial 
numbers of the population live close to an area in which significantly cheaper tobacco products are 
available, or in which smuggling is already a problem.  
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Industry arguments that the revenue from earmarked tobacco tax increases would be diverted or misused 
seems likely to have been particularly persuasive to the public and/or policymakers as such diversions did 
occur, in part as a result of tobacco industry efforts, allowing the industry to gather evidence to support this 
claim.  This suggests that advocates for earmarked tobacco tax proposals need to ensure that revenue 
allocation is clearly agreed at an early stage (preferably without tobacco industry involvement) and that 
this is closely monitored in order to prevent later changes.[25]  
 
Favoured industry tactics to influence policy decisions about tobacco excise largely mirror those used by 
the industry to influence policy more generally,[70,71-73,75-80] including: establishing ‘front groups’, 
allying with third parties that have (or can be persuaded to have) a shared interest in the industry’s 
position; direct lobbying of relevant officials; media and publicity campaigns; legal (or other official) 
challenges; commissioning/using supportive research; employing professional consultants and public 
relations services; paying or giving gifts to policy-makers; proposing alternative legislation; and using 
friendly ‘experts’.  However, three of the most successful tactics were tax-policy specific: confusing 
debates about tobacco excise increases with broader tax debates; stimulating smuggling in order to 
support claims that tax increases have contributed to more illicit trade; and working to divert earmarked 
funds (see above). 
 
The limited evidence concerning industry efforts to influence tobacco excise structures (seven papers 
in seven different countries/regions), suggests different companies favour different tax structures (e.g. 
Philip Morris seems to prefer specific structures, which favour the more expensive profile of its 
brands, and BAT seems to prefer mixed excise structures, incorporating ad valorem elements, which 
favours its more mixed brand portfolio – see Box 1).  Yet both present their preferred structure as the 
best means of reducing illicit trade and increasing government revenue, even when aware this is not 
necessarily true.[15,57]  There is also some limited evidence that companies shift their position on import 
duties in relation to their market dominance.  This highlights the need to be aware of company and 
context specific differences.  Indeed, for tax policy, it may be unhelpful to refer generically to the 
‘tobacco industry’. 
 
The lack of studies focusing on industry efforts to influence tax structures also signals the need for 
further research, not least because certain structures can work to limit the availability of cheap 
tobacco products,[8] and because most of the existing research in this area focuses on countries 
undergoing economic and political transformation.[14,15,17,57,58]  We currently know very little 
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about tobacco company efforts to influence tax structures in stable economies. 
 
The significant geographical bias of included studies towards the US is important as the US is one of 
the world’s most economically developed countries and tobacco excise levels are lower there than in 
many other high income countries.[81]  It should therefore not be assumed that the industry will take 
the same positions or approaches elsewhere. Indeed, even within the US, it is clear that approaches 
vary with context (e.g. between states allowing public ballot initiatives and states in which the 
legislature is the only route to achieving tobacco tax increases).  Further research in the US could 
usefully identify the extent to which tobacco industry arguments and tactics for influencing tax policies 
vary with the political profile of states, over time and with other factors, such as the level of tobacco 
farming.  Beyond the US, reviews of non-English evidence and/or further research on all aspects of 
tax-related lobbying is urgently required as the evidence we were able to locate relating to the rest of 
the world was extremely limited.  Increasing the evidence-base on tobacco industry efforts to 
influence tax policies will enable us to better understand what different parts of the industry aim to 
achieve in relation to tobacco excise rates and structures in a variety of contexts, and why.  This, in 
turn, should aid public health efforts to achieve tobacco taxation policies that most effectively support 
tobacco control. 
 
 
Box 3: What is already known about this topic? 
 Many case studies of tobacco industry efforts to influence specific tobacco tax policies exist 
but there has been no attempt to collate or collectively assess this information. 
 
What this paper adds 
 This paper systematically reviews tobacco industry efforts to influence tax policies. 
 The review demonstrates that tobacco companies tend uniformly (often collectively) to lobby 
against tobacco tax increases and that the four most commonly identified arguments in the 
existing literature are that tax increases: stimulate illicit trade; are socially regressive; are unfair on 
smokers; and have negative economic impacts. Tactics to influence tax levels generally mirror 
broader tobacco industry efforts to influence policies but also include some tax-specific tactics, 
such as trying to confuse debates about tobacco tax increases with broader tax policy debates. 
 Comparing the industry arguments to keep taxes low identified in this review across studies 
and against up-to-date expert evidence, the paper identifies the misleading nature of many of 
these arguments. 
 The review also highlights the paucity of research on tobacco industry efforts to influence: (i) 
tobacco tax structures; and (ii) tobacco tax policies outside the US. 
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Summary of studies concerning tobacco industry tobacco tax related lobbying (NB publications focusing on the same tax proposals are assessed collectively) 
Study Methods Critical 
Appraisal* 
Key findings in relation to tobacco industry (TI) efforts to influence tobacco tax policies 
 
Aim of the TI & context            Arguments used                     Tactics employed                    Success of TI 
Studies concerned with tobacco industry efforts to influence tobacco tax levels (and, where applicable, associated plans for hypothecation / earmarking of taxes) 
Alamar & 
Glantz, 
2004[18] 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents. 
1-3,5-7,9,10  Aim: To prevent a significant 
tax increase proposed in the 
‘McCain Bill’ in the USA. 
Context: The ‘McCain Bill’ 
was a Federal level US bill 
intended to enact various 
aspects of the Global 
Settlement. By the time the 
bill passed the Commerce 
Committee on 1 April 1998, it 
had been amended to 
strengthen the public health 
provisions and reduce the 
protections that it provided 
the tobacco industry. A key 
change was a $1.10 
increase in the federal 
excise tax on cigarettes 
(others included a provision 
to impose fines on the 
industry if youth smoking did 
not reduce to certain levels, 
and the removal of legal 
immunity provisions for the 
industry). The article focuses 
on efforts by the industry to 
prevent this bill during 1998. 
- Attempted to frame the 
bill as the ‘largest tax 
increase in history’ and a 
‘bureaucratic mess’. 
- Claimed the increase 
would lead to increased 
levels of illicit trade and 
associated law and order 
problems. 
 
- Used Wall Street analysts to 
present arguments about 
smuggling (tobacco industry 
briefed analysts, who then 
presented themselves as 
independent). 
- Promoted the idea the tax 
increase would create a 
significant smuggling problem 
via mass media articles and 
in an advertising campaign 
arguing that Washington was 
‘creating a serious new law 
enforcement problem’. 
- Geoffrey Bible (Chief 
Executive, Philip Morris) 
invoked smuggling as one his 
main concerns and urged 
shareholders to tell their 
senators to vote against the 
bill. 
- The McCain Bill was 
defeated in June 1998, 
though it is unclear to 
what extent the tobacco 
industry’s campaign 
contributed to this 
result. 
Alamar, 
Mahmoud 
Unclear (though 
draws on tobacco 
5,6  Aim: To keep tobacco tax 
increases to a minimum in 
- Tax increases will lead to 
significant increases in 
- Use of consultancy 
companies to provide 
Not assessed (not the 
main focus of article). 
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Aim of the TI & context            Arguments used                     Tactics employed                    Success of TI 
and Glantz, 
2003[19] 
industry documents). California, USA. 
Context: This report focuses 
on estimates of tobacco 
smuggling in California, the 
tobacco industry’s 
involvement with these 
estimates and their use of 
exaggerated estimates to 
fight proposals for tobacco 
tax increases.  As such, the 
report does not focus on 
specific proposals to 
increase taxes, although it 
notes that California (along 
with other states) was 
considering raising taxes in 
1994 and that a tax increase 
was passed in California in 
1999. Most of the industry 
documents that were 
analyzed relate to the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
smuggling. 
- Increased smuggling will 
lead to: (a) lost 
government revenue; (b) 
increased activity by 
criminal groups; (c) undue 
hardships for retailers and 
distributors who refuse to 
handle contraband 
cigarettes; (d) the initiation 
of a large section of the 
population into criminal 
activity and tax evasion. 
supportive (and misleading) 
evidence about the link 
between taxes and 
smuggling, based on 
Canadian experiences. 
- Use of front groups to 
publicise arguments, 
including The National 
Coalition Against Crime and 
Tobacco Contraband (funded 
by R.J. Reynolds). 
- Writing to newspapers. 
- Segmenting and targeting 
citizens (especially poorer 
smokers) with the intent of 
enlisting them in anti-tax 
campaigns and encouraging 
them to lobby political 
representatives. 
- As part of above, the 
tobacco industry set up 
telephone banks with toll-free 
numbers, sometimes 
connecting callers directly 
through to congressional 
offices, and circulated printed 
postcards and petitions. 
- Claims the tobacco industry 
was involved in smuggling.  
- Encouraged retailers and 
right-wing organisations to 
resist proposals for tobacco 
tax increases. 
- Coordinated the activities of 
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Aim of the TI & context            Arguments used                     Tactics employed                    Success of TI 
different tobacco companies 
to maximize impact of efforts. 
- Encouraged tobacco 
industry personnel ‘to write to 
Congress and the President 
as affected individuals, not as 
tobacco company workers’. 
Balbach & 
Campbell, 
2009 and 
Balbach, 
Herzberg, & 
Barbeau, 
2006[20,21] 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents 
and other related 
documents, including 
Coalition of Labor 
Union Women 
(CLUW) News, the in-
house newspaper of 
CLUW. 
1-7, 9,10   Aim: Overall aim was to 
prevent tobacco excise 
increases in the USA. 
Intermediate aims included 
discouraging liberal and 
labor groups from taking 
anti-tobacco positions 
(including on tobacco excise) 
and shifting the focus of the 
debate away from the effects 
of tax increases on cigarette 
consumption, onto the 
effects on the people paying 
cigarette taxes. 
Context: These studies 
document how the tobacco 
industry created a political 
partnership with the Coalition 
of Labor Union Women 
(CLUW), a group 
representing female trade 
unionists in the US, between 
mid-1980s and 1997, and 
used this partnership to 
lobby against cigarette 
excise tax increases. It 
focuses on this relationship, 
- That cigarette taxes are 
regressive and unfair to 
working women. 
- Also tried to frame 
tobacco taxation as part of 
broader debates about 
generic consumer excise 
taxes (including petrol and 
alcohol). 
- In 1984, the Tobacco 
Institute established the 
Labor Management 
Committee (LMC), which was 
composed of the Institute and 
five unions representing 
tobacco industry employees. 
the LMC’s functions included: 
(i) Lobbying and briefing 
elected officials at all levels of 
government; (ii) discouraging 
liberal and labor coalitions 
from taking anti-tobacco 
positions, including on 
tobacco excise taxes; (iii) 
building support for industry 
positions throughout the labor 
movement; and (iv) 
facilitating general public 
communication on relevant 
issues. 
- The tobacco industry 
provided financial (at least 
$221,500 between 1988 and 
1996) and in-kind support to 
the Coalition of Labor Union 
Women (CLUW) in order to 
- The tobacco industry 
was successful in 
influencing CLUW’s 
position on tobacco 
excise taxes (CLUW did 
campaign against such 
increases & against 
earmarking). 
- Authors acknowledge 
that ‘it is difficult to know 
how much or if the 
CLUW’s involvement in 
the policy process made 
a difference’ to overall 
excise policy outcomes 
but say, ‘there are 
indications that 
organised labor was 
important in federal level 
policy making’. 
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rather then specific 
proposals for tobacco tax 
increases, although it largely 
focuses on federal level 
debates and has a particular 
focus on the tobacco tax 
increases proposed as part 
of the Clinton healthcare 
reform proposals (i.e. 
tobacco tax increases 
earmarked for healthcare) 
engage CLUW’s interest in 
smoke-free worksite 
legislation and proposed 
tobacco tax increases. 
- The Tobacco Institute 
facilitated its relationships 
with CLUW (and similar 
groups) by working via the 
LMC. 
- The Institute supported the 
production of a series of 
studies by labor groups, 
including CLUW, which 
demonstrated the regressive 
nature of tobacco taxes. 
- The Tobacco Institute 
monitored press coverage 
and advised CLUW on how to 
promote study messages to 
the media. 
- CLUW and similar 
organisations were 
encouraged to oppose 
earmarked tobacco taxes, 
such as those proposed in 
Clinton universal healthcare 
proposals. 
- The tobacco industry was 
aware that many labor 
organisations, including 
CLUW, were generally 
supportive of higher taxes so 
they encouraged them to 
push for higher taxes on 
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Appraisal* 
Key findings in relation to tobacco industry (TI) efforts to influence tobacco tax policies 
 
Aim of the TI & context            Arguments used                     Tactics employed                    Success of TI 
corporations, rather than 
cigarettes. This included 
assisting the Citizens for Tax 
Justice group with the 
promotion of its annual 
examination of ‘corporate 
freeloaders’. 
Balbach, 
Traynor, & 
Glantz, 
2000; Glantz 
& Balbach, 
2000; 
Traynor & 
Glantz, 
1996; 
Begay, 
Traynor, & 
Glantz, 1993 
[22,24,53,56] 
Analysis of relevant 
documents 
(published reports, 
public documents, 
personal 
correspondence, 
newspaper accounts, 
press releases, 
polling data, internal 
memos and some 
industry documents). 
Interviews were also 
undertaken with 
representatives form 
organisations that 
participated in the 
Proposition 99 
campaign (although 
tobacco industry 
representatives 
refused to be 
interviewed). 
- Authors also 
undertook an analysis 
of reports by the 
California Fair 
Political Practices 
1-7, 9,10   Aims: To defeat Proposition 
99 in California (which 
proposed to add $0.25 to 
state cigarette tax and 
earmark 20% of the revenue 
for tobacco education and 
prevention programmes). 
Once Proposition 99 had 
passed, the aim was to 
divert earmarked funds away 
from tobacco control 
activities/programmes. 
Context: A collection of 
publications focusing on 
state-level efforts to achieve 
a tobacco tax increase in 
California (by direct public 
vote), which was passed in 
1988. Largely focuses on 
industry activities between 
mid-1980s and mid-1990s. 
- Claimed the law would 
create another 
unnecessary State 
bureaucracy with a large 
budget and that the 
government was likely to 
mismanage the revenue it 
created. 
- Tried to move the issue 
away from smoking by 
focusing on generic tax-
related arguments. 
- Suggested $0.25 was too 
much of an increase on a 
single product. 
- Claimed the increased 
tax would lead to 
increased smuggling and 
bootlegging. 
- Built on this to claim 
police attention would be 
diverted away from other 
police business and that 
more money would be 
spent on guns and drugs. 
- Argued tobacco tax was 
just another way for 
- The Tobacco Institute 
commissioned a state-wide 
poll to establish which 
arguments against the 
Proposition were most likely 
to persuade voters not to 
support it (and found 
arguments concerning the 
creation of more bureaucracy 
and likely government 
mismanagement of revenue 
were most persuasive so 
then focused on these). 
- Hired a consulting firm to 
establish the Californians 
Against Unfair Tax Increases 
(CAUTI). 
- Undertook direct lobbying of 
legislature. 
- Persuaded the California 
Medical Association not to 
follow-through on a 
commitment to give funds to 
the pro-Proposition 99 
campaign. 
- Worked with private 
healthcare and groups 
Mixed: 
- Proposition 99 passed 
in 1988, so the tobacco 
industry failed to 
prevent it. 
- However, the tobacco 
education and 
prevention programmes, 
which had been 
earmarked to receive 
20% of the revenue, did 
not receive their full 
allocation, which was 
instead diverted (largely 
to healthcare 
organisations): ‘The 
underfunding amounts 
to $174.7 million 
redirected to medical 
care programs from 
fiscal years 1989-1990 
through 1993-1994, 
despite clear language 
in Proposition 99 
specifying how the 
money should be spent.’ 
- Following lawsuits by 
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Commission, 
statements filed with 
the California 
secretary of state's 
Political Reform 
Division, and data on 
Proposition 99 
expenditures from 
various official budget 
documents. 
- Conducted ‘a 
multivariate 
simultaneous 
equations statistical 
analysis of data on 
campaign 
contributions from the 
tobacco industry to 
legislators in the 
1991-1992 election, 
their records on 
tobacco control policy 
as scored by tobacco 
control advocates, 
members' personal 
characteristics, and 
constituents' attitudes 
towards tobacco 
control.’ 
special interests, such as 
physicians, to become 
richer. 
- Framed tobacco tax as a 
regressive tax that would 
negatively affect blue-
collar workers. 
- Argued Proposition 99 
violated California’s 1978 
property tax-cutting 
initiative and other tax 
rules. 
representing medics to 
ensure funds were diverted 
away from tobacco control 
education programmes and 
towards medical care 
programmes (which went 
against the specifications of 
the public ballot). This 
provided ‘crucial political 
coverage for the tobacco 
industry and the politicians 
that supported it’ 
- Helped establish the 
Californians for Smoker’s 
Rights (CSR) group to 
promote tobacco industry 
arguments and target 
tobacco control programmes. 
- Made payments to key 
officials (money often 
channelled via advertising 
agencies and law firms so did 
not appear to be tobacco 
industry money). 
- CAUTI circulated its own 
petition in 1988, as the pro-
Proposition 99 effort was 
underway to gather 
supportive signatures, called 
‘The Tobacco Tax Ripoff’. 
This was not official and was 
merely used as a way of 
reducing the pool of available 
paid signature-gatherers (by 
public health groups, 
and extensive media 
coverage of the issue, 
the health education 
account finally received 
its full allocation in 
1996. 
- The tobacco industry’s 
legal challenge failed. 
- But polls indicated the 
industry’s adverts did 
have an effect, reducing 
public support for the 
initiative. 
- However, various 
factors undermined one 
of industry’s most 
popular arguments 
(concerning smuggling 
and police work), 
including an official 
report that concluded 
the effect on smuggling 
was likely to be 
negligible and which 
criticised CAUTI’s 
advertisements.  Police 
groups which had 
supported the tobacco 
industry position 
subsequently dropped 
their support. In 
addition, it was revealed 
that the ‘undercover 
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paying them more) and to 
confuse voters about Prop 
99. 
- CAUTI held a press 
conference to promote its 
argument that the proposed 
tobacco tax was just another 
way for special interests, 
such as physicians, to 
become richer. 
- The tobacco industry, 
through CAUTI, saturated TV, 
radio and print media with 
paid ads to promote their 
positions. Their most effective 
ad featured an allegedly real 
undercover police officer 
discussing the crime 
implications arguments (more 
time would be spent on 
smuggled cigarettes, hence 
less time on other police 
issues, and the increased 
criminal money from 
smuggling, etc would be 
spent on drugs and guns). 
- The tobacco industry legally 
challenged Proposition 99 on 
the basis it violated 
California’s 1978 property 
tax-cutting initiative and other 
tax laws. 
- CAUTI initially secured the 
endorsements of the 
policeman’ in the 
industry’s most effective 
advertisement only had 
a police desk job and 
was also a part time 
actor.  
- Claims ‘Although there 
is little evidence 
showing that the 
tobacco industry has 
‘bought’ legislators' 
votes, early research 
strongly suggests that 
tobacco industry's 
campaign contributions 
are influencing the 
behavior of California 
legislators in matters 
related to tobacco 
policy-making, 
independent of 
constituents' support for 
tobacco control.’  
- Notes the multivariate 
simultaneous equations 
statistical analysis of 
data on campaign 
contributions from the 
tobacco industry to 
legislators indicated that 
the industry had ‘a 
statistically detectable 
effect on legislative 
behavior’. 
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Californian Sheriffs’ 
Association and the California 
Peace Officers’ Association, 
which gave further credibility 
to their crime/smuggling 
related arguments. 
- Found the tobacco industry 
was investing heavily in the 
Californian legislature, 
spending political money 
more intensively there than in 
the US Congress (industry 
lobbying expenditures grew 
10-fold from 1985-1986 to 
1987-1988, when Proposition 
99 passed). 
- Powerful individuals in the 
legislature seem to have 
been particularly targeted, 
e.g. ‘In 1991-1992, the 
Speaker received $221 367, 
making him the largest single 
legislative recipient of 
tobacco industry contributions 
in the United States’ (explains 
‘the Speaker of the 
Assembly, the single most 
powerful member of the 
legislature and second only to 
the governor in influence). 
- The industry also re-
organised lobbying efforts, 
hiring large, private firms to 
lobby legislators and state 
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officials after Proposition 99 
passed, rather than relying on 
organisations like the 
Tobacco Institute, as they 
previously had. Some of the 
firms hired also worked for 
medical groups, which 
tobacco industry wanted to 
side with in efforts to divert 
revenue. 
- ‘[I]n 1989, the Tobacco 
Institute offered to contribute 
$250,000 to the California 
Medical Association to divert 
Health Education Account 
funds to medical care 
programs through a Medical 
Association-sponsored ballot 
initiative’. 
Bialous & 
Glantz, 
1999[25] 
Case study using 
data from semi-
structured interviews 
‘with key players in 
the initiative’ and 
‘written records’ 
(documentary data 
gathered from written 
records and 
newspaper clippings). 
1-3,5-7,9,10   Aim: To prevent Proposition 
200 in Arizona and then 
divert earmarked funds away 
from tobacco control 
programmes (the Proposition 
aimed to increase the 
cigarette excise tax by 
$0.40, with proportional 
increases in the tax on other 
tobacco products. Increased 
revenues were earmarked: 
23% for tobacco prevention/ 
education programmes, 5% 
for tobacco-related diseases 
and prevention research, 
- Framed initiative as an 
attempt by proponents to 
divert large amounts of 
taxpayer money for their 
own benefit. 
- Used the diversion of 
health education funds into 
medical services by the 
California legislature (see 
above) as an example of 
how the tobacco tax funds 
were going to benefit 
healthcare providers. 
- Claimed that California’s 
tobacco control 
- Used front-groups - ‘Enough 
is Enough’ and ‘No More 
Taxes’, which were 99.96% 
financed by Philip Morris and 
the Tobacco Institute, 
respectively, to campaign 
against the initiative. 
- Increased lobbying of the 
state legislature, with the 
number of paid tobacco 
industry lobbyists rising from 
approximately four to 18. 
- Once Proposition had been 
passed, the tobacco industry 
legally challenged some of 
- The Proposition 
passed so tobacco 
industry failed to 
prevent it. 
- The industry also failed 
to divert funds away 
from tobacco control 
programmes. 
- However, the tobacco 
education programme 
experienced a range of 
other problems and was 
never fully implemented 
as planned. Authors 
suggest tobacco 
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70% to provide medical care 
for the poor, and 2% to offset 
future loss of tobacco tax 
revenues by the Arizona 
Department of Corrections).  
Context: State level effort to 
pass a tobacco tax increase 
via a direct public vote, in 
Arizona. Study focused on 
1992-1997 period. By the 
time this was taking place, 
authors note two other states 
had already passed very 
similar legislation (California 
in 1988 and Massachusetts 
in 1991). Officials involved in 
initiative in Arizona not only 
studied these developments 
but also involved some of 
the same consultants and 
voluntary health 
organizations. The tax was 
proposed during a period in 
which there was a perceived 
need to raise funds for 
Arizona’s state. Previous 
attempts to work with the 
legislature to raise tobacco 
taxes had failed. 
Simultaneously to working to 
secure appropriation of 
Proposition 200 funds, 
health advocates also had to 
stop a series of pro-tobacco 
programme was misusing 
public funds. 
the contracts agreed with 
health education funds. 
- Threatened local level 
boards with legal action over 
tobacco control programmes. 
- Tried to pass pre-emptive 
legislation to limit local 
tobacco control programmes. 
industry activities played 
a role in this. 
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bills that would have 
preempted local tobacco 
control efforts.  
Breton, 
Richard, 
Gagnon, 
Jacques, & 
Bergeron, 
2006[26] 
Analysis based of: (i) 
569 articles from four 
Québec daily 
newspapers 
published between 
1986 and 1998; (ii) 28 
semi-structured 
interviews with key 
informants, and (iii) 
200 government 
documents / 
transcriptions of 
parliamentary 
debates relating to 
the problem of 
smoking. 
1-6,8   Aim: Initial aim was to avoid 
further tax increases, 
following tax increases in 
early 1980s. By early 1992, 
the industry had begun to 
argue for a drastic reduction 
in tobacco taxes. 
Context: Study focuses on 
efforts to increase tobacco 
taxes in the province of 
Québec, Canada, between 
mid-1980s and late-1990s, 
and tobacco industry’s 
response to these efforts.  
- Initially, the tobacco 
industry challenged tax 
increases primarily on 
economic grounds, with 
arguments concerning the 
industry’s profitability. 
- Also argued taxes were 
unfair on smokers. 
- Later focused on 
arguments that the tax 
increases were fuelling 
smuggling (including high 
economic cost of this to 
government and retailers, 
and failure to help control 
tobacco use). 
- Argued against export 
taxes and better policing 
as solutions to the 
smuggling problem. 
- Presented taxes as 
‘excessive’ and tobacco 
control groups as having 
dominated policy:  
- Following tax decreases, 
the tobacco industry 
argued smoking rises in 
young people were 
unrelated to the change in 
price.  
- Various groups supported 
the tobacco industry position 
(retail sales sector and 
journalists). Unclear how 
much the tobacco industry 
was linked to groups / 
individuals in these sectors. 
The ‘Québec Food Retailers 
Association’ was a 
particularly active group, 
which ‘called a press 
conference’ in 1992 and 
demanded ‘a 70% reduction 
in tobacco taxes to put an 
end to smuggling’. Authors 
claim tobacco industry was 
involved in funding this group. 
- A group specifically 
campaigning on this issue, 
the Mouvement pour 
l’abolition des taxes 
réservées aux cigarettes 
(MATRAC) was set up but 
authors do not comment on 
whether the tobacco industry 
was involved in 
funding/establishing this 
group. 
- Claims the tobacco industry 
‘was able to mobilise union 
representatives and its 
- Initially, the tobacco 
industry and its allies 
had little influence, 
partly as the tobacco 
industry was perceived 
to be in decline in 
Canada. 
- However, framing the 
issue as a ‘contraband 
problem’ succeeded in 
winning support from a 
broad coalition of 
actors, including 
retailers, media 
commentators and the 
representatives of 
employers’ 
organisations. 
- The health lobby 
received less media 
coverage and was 
subject to criticism that 
they had an ‘extremist’ 
stance. 
- Eventually, ‘a massive 
reduction’ in tobacco 
taxes was achieved, not 
just in Québec (at 
province level) but also 
in the taxes levied by 
five other provinces, 
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employees. 
- The tobacco industry helped 
organise small retailers, 
whose comments quoted in 
the media gained public 
sympathy. 
- Ran an ‘effective media 
strategy’. 
- Managed to get ‘police 
support’ on smuggling issue. 
- Disseminated the findings of 
surveys on different facets of 
the problem. 
- Arguments were presented 
as being on behalf of citizens, 
not the tobacco industry. 
including Ontario and at 
a federal level.  
- This led to an increase 
in smoking rates 
amongst young people. 
- Political elites 
responded to this by 
implementing a range of 
strong tobacco control 
strategies (although 
they did not re-raise the 
tobacco tax).  
- The industry was 
clearly successful in 
reducing tobacco taxes, 
though the authors 
claim that in the broader 
context of tobacco 
control, the tobacco 
industry’s success was 
more mixed: ‘the 
smuggling crisis was an 
event that, despite its 
unfortunate 
repercussions on 
tobacco taxes, helped 
put the tobacco problem 
in Québec, especially 
among young people, 
on the government’s 
agenda.’ 
Campbell & 
Balbach, 
2008[27] 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents. 
1-3,5-10   Aim: To challenge policy 
interest in significantly 
raising tobacco taxes in the 
Tobacco taxes are 
regressive. 
- The tobacco industry 
created and funded the 
Consumer Tax Alliance 
- In exchange for 
funding, various 
labor/progressive 
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US by turning labor and 
middle-class opinion against 
prospective excise tax 
increases. Initial focus was 
on federal increases but in 
1991, efforts turned to state-
based tax proposals. 
Context: This study largely 
focuses on industry efforts to 
prevent federal US tobacco 
tax increases, although it 
notes that tobacco industry 
efforts later turned to state 
level campaigns. It focuses 
on activities in the1980s and 
early 1990s (until 1993). 
Notes that excise taxes had 
become increasingly 
accepted as a policy 
instrument to decrease 
smoking in 1980s and that 
tobacco industry was aware 
of this. Also notes that a rise 
in federal budget deficits in 
the 1980s in the USA had 
created a need to raise 
funds and that excise taxes 
were seen as more politically 
viable than other taxes. 
(CTA) in 1989 to build 
opposition to excise taxes. 
The CTA focused on 
garnering support from 
credible ‘liberal’ allies, 
particularly genuine public 
interest groups (groups 
traditionally perceived to be 
at odds with the tobacco 
industry). NB The CTA 
appears to have been 
dissolved in 1993. 
- Also focused on garnering 
media coverage of the issue 
(this included sponsorship of 
TV adverts, plus a media tour 
by CTA Executive Director). 
- By working via the CTA 
(which did not divulge the 
industry’s role in its 
formation), the tobacco 
industry was able to obscure 
its own role in these efforts. 
groups did publicly take 
positions against 
increasing tobacco 
excise taxes. 
- ‘The Tobacco Institute 
was pleased with the 
impact of the [TV] 
advertising [sponsored 
by the CTA], as 
measured by tracking 
polls commissioned to 
measure their 
effectiveness’ which 
found they increased 
people’s opposition to 
tobacco excise taxes.  
- Tobacco excise taxes 
were increased in 1990 
and 1993 at USA 
federal level, but the 
increase was much less 
than originally 
anticipated (8 cents, 
rather than 16 cents) 
and was introduced in 
two phases. Authors 
acknolwedge that it is 
not possible to say 
whether or how CTA 
activities affected this 
outcome. 
Campbell & 
Balbach, 
2009[28] 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents 
and media reports 
2,3,6,7,9,10   Aims: To shift debate away 
from the effects of cigarettes, 
onto the impacts on people 
- That cigarette taxes are 
regressive and that tax 
increases of regressive 
- The Tobacco Institute’s 
strategy included recruiting 
‘organized labor, minorities, 
- CTJ initially responded 
to the tobacco industry’s 
approach by saying 
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(located through 
searches on Lexis—
Nexis). 
paying cigarette taxes in the 
US. To broaden the issues 
being discussed so that 
tobacco taxation was framed 
as part of a broad category 
of consumer excise taxes. 
To discourage liberal and 
labor groups from taking 
anti-tobacco positions, 
including on tobacco excise 
increases. 
Context: It focuses on 
coalitions between Tobacco 
Institute and Citizens for Tax 
Justice (CTJ) and Citizen 
Action (CA) between late 
1980s and late 1990s. 
Activities mostly focused on 
legislative, federal level 
initiatives but study also 
considers how initiatives at 
state level built on federal 
experiences, often involving 
similar actors, organisations 
and tactics. 
taxes are unfair. 
- That this is true even 
when taxes are earmarked 
for health care spending. 
- That there is little 
evidence that increasing 
taxes on alcohol and 
cigarettes reduces 
consumption. 
and other liberal groups’ to: 
provide early warnings of 
legislative tax initiatives; help 
tobacco industry lobbyists 
gain access to legislators 
who were not industry allies; 
demonstrate constituent 
support for pro-tobacco 
votes; and testify on the 
industry's behalf. 
- The Labor Management 
Committee was used to 
obscure connections between 
the Tobacco Institute and the 
labor groups it worked with, 
such as CTJ and CA.  
- The tobacco industry 
supported CTJ to hold a 
conference in 1987, which 
focused on promoting the 
arguments that had been 
used at federal level to state 
level. 
- CTJ lobbied Senate Finance 
Committee. 
- CTJ position pieces were 
covered in the mass media. 
- As tobacco tax concerns 
moved increasingly to state 
level, the tobacco industry 
(through the Labor 
Management Committee) 
recruited CA in a similar way 
to CTJ and for similar 
tobacco excise was not 
a priority issue for the 
organisation, but later 
agreed to work with the 
industry when it 
received funding, from 
1984 onwards. The 
relationship deepened 
in 1986 as more funding 
was provided. CTJ took 
anti-tobacco tax 
positions and lobbied on 
this issue, including by 
testifying before the 
Senate Finance 
Committee against an 
increase in the federal 
tax on cigarettes. 
- The industry was also 
successful and forging 
similar relationships with 
CA, persuading CA to 
oppose cigarette excise 
tax increases as well. 
- The tobacco industry 
appeared pleased with 
activities on tax 
undertaken by both CA 
and CTJ, including on 
earmarking issue (which 
included Clinton’s 
healthcare proposals). 
- The Tobacco Institute 
was dissolved in 1998 
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reasons (CA was better 
organised at state level, 
being more of a grassroots 
organisation). 
- In addition, the tobacco 
industry recruited other 
‘progressive tax’ groups. 
- CA and CTJ were also used 
to help the tobacco industry 
lobby against proposals that 
tobacco tax increases would 
be earmarked for health care 
spending. 
as part of the Master 
Settlement but ‘interest 
in cigarette excise taxes 
remains high’ and 
‘controversy continues 
over the economic 
hardship they may 
cause for low-income 
smokers’ and on ‘the 
fairness of raising 
revenue from one 
population subgroup 
(smokers) for programs 
with broader social 
benefits.’ 
Center for 
Tobacco 
Policy 
Research, 
2006 and 
Center for 
Tobacco 
Policy 
Research, 
2008[29,30] 
Mixed methods 
based on:  
- 22 key informant 
interviews conducted 
between December 
2007 and February 
2008 with 
stakeholders involved 
in varying levels of 
the tobacco tax 
campaign. 
- A content analysis 
of print media 
coverage during the 
campaign. 
- Results from a 
(polling) survey that 
was conducted at 
three points during 
1-3,9,10   Aim: The tobacco industry’s 
aims are not clearly stated 
but the report implies that 
their aim was to defeat the 
campaign by the Committee 
for a Healthy Future (CHF) 
for an earmarked $0.80 
tobacco increase, which was 
to be achieved via a 
November 2006 direct public 
vote in Missouri, USA. 
Context: Focuses on state 
level efforts to achieve a 
tobacco tax increase in 
Missouri, US, by direct public 
vote. Focuses on a 
campaign conducted 
between 2005-2006, 
although also refers back to 
- Claimed the proposed 
level of tax increase was 
so large it was 
‘outrageous’. 
- Funds raised by the 
increase would be 
allocated inappropriately 
by unreliable politicians, 
and used by ‘greedy’ 
doctors. 
- Suggested it would be 
unwise to let politicians 
‘mess around’ with the 
constitution (argument 
made in the context of 
public distrust of 
politicians). 
- Funded groups not 
obviously connected to the 
tobacco industry, notably the 
Missouri Petroleum 
Marketers and Convenience 
Stores Association (MPCA), 
and the Missourians Against 
Tax Abuse, both of which 
worked to oppose the 
proposal via anti-tobacco tax 
campaigns. The MPCA 
supported a ‘grassroots 
convenience store based 
voter education program’ 
campaign.  
- The tobacco industry 
(particularly Philip Morris) 
engaged in discussions about 
a possible compromise 
Mixed: 
- CHF won a lawsuit and 
was successful in 
getting a ballot on the 
issue for November 
2006. 
- However, voters 
rejected the proposal on 
November 6, 2006 
(51.4% against and 
48.6% support). 
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the campaign ‘to 
assess the reach and 
impact of the […] 
educational 
campaign’. 
a campaign in 2002. proposal, which would have 
involved ‘a phased-in 
cigarette tax over a period of 
time and removal of the tax 
on smokeless tobacco 
products’.  
- Legal challenges to the 
proposal and challenges 
relating to signature collection 
for the supporting ballot 
(which resulted in additional 
signatures being required) 
were mounted but it is 
unclear from this article if the 
tobacco industry was behind 
this. 
- Targeted left-of-center and 
minority politicians to promote 
opposition to the tax. 
- Used television media to 
advertise anti-tax messages 
(four weeks before 
supporters did). 
- The ‘opposition’ (it is 
unclear how much the 
tobacco industry was 
involved) worked to confuse 
different ballot initiatives (on 
stem cell research and 
minimum wage) with the 
tobacco tax one. 
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Dearlove 
and Glantz, 
2000; 
Levenstein, 
Delaurier, 
Ahmed, & 
Balbach, 
2005.[31,43] 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents 
and union 
publications, 
newspapers, and 
other general 
publications relevant 
to the case study, 
plus examined New 
York case law and 
legislative history, 
and interviews with 
key personnel. 
1,2,5-7,9,10   Aim: To prevent the passage 
of two types of legislation in 
New York State, US: excise 
taxes on tobacco products 
and workplace smoking 
restrictions. Industry aimed 
to prevent questions on 
these issues from qualifying 
for direct public vote and to 
defeat those proposals that 
made it to the ballot. 
Dearlove and Glantz study 
focuses particularly on 
efforts to stop a 1993 tax 
proposal to increase tax by 
21 cents and a 1999 bill to 
increase tax by another 55 
cents. 
Context: Focuses on state 
level efforts to increases 
tobacco taxes in New York, 
which included direct public 
vote action (but studies also 
discuss lobbying of 
legislature). Focuses on 
period from mid-1980s until 
1999. 
- Tobacco excise taxes 
were framed as unfair and 
regressive. 
- Tobacco companies 
argued that New York 
would lose sales to 
adjacent states through 
cross border purchases, 
and that this would have a 
negative economic impact 
on New York state retailers 
(it was argued that they 
would lose trade on goods 
other than tobacco as a 
result of customer 
decisions to purchase 
cigarettes and other goods 
at the same time from 
neighbouring states with 
lower tobacco taxes). 
- Also argued it would have 
a negative impact on the 
State (via lost tax 
revenues). 
- The tobacco industry 
produced econometric 
models predicting the loss 
of 12,000 jobs in relation to 
the 1993 bill. 
- For 1993 bill, argued that 
raising the tax would be 
regressive, that it would 
encourage smuggling and 
that state excise taxes 
- The tobacco industry set up 
the LMC (see above). 
- From mid-1980s to late-
1990s, the LMC ‘worked to 
elicit support in New York by 
framing issues in terms that 
made them salient to unions.’ 
- The unions sided with the 
tobacco industry in hope ‘that 
such cooperation would be of 
advantage to them in their 
efforts to protect and 
strengthen their organisation. 
The tobacco industry and 
LMC undertook research so 
that they understood the 
concerns of labor, and 
appeared ready to champion 
these concerns.’ This 
included assisting unions 
even on issues of ‘no 
concern’ to the tobacco 
industry. 
- The tobacco industry’s 
focus was on the leaders of 
unions / labor groups, rather 
than their members as it was 
these people who had 
political influence. 
- The LMC lobbied and 
briefed elected officials at all 
levels of government, worked 
to discourage liberal and 
labor coalitions from taking 
- The LMC was 
‘generally successful in 
gaining labor support in 
New York for positions 
on excise taxes and, 
especially, worksite 
smoking restrictions. 
- However, by the late 
1990s, the support had 
largely evaporated, with 
trade unions in New 
York either in support 
of, or at least neutral on, 
both issues. 
- From 1985, tobacco 
excise tax ‘increased 
only slowly and 
marginally’ but in 1999 it 
was doubled. 
- The LMC succeeded in 
dividing public health 
and labor groups for a 
while. 
- However, the LMC 
largely failed to attract 
support from public 
sector unions in New 
York state as they were 
dependent on state 
budgets so could not be 
counted on to resist any 
action that might help 
replenish ‘state coffers’. 
Hence, ‘While regularly 
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were generally unreliable 
and ‘never raise the 
amounts of money their 
proponents predict’.   
- For the 1999 proposal, 
the tobacco industry again 
argued that the tobacco 
tax increase would prompt 
consumers to turn to 
neighbouring states or 
Indian reservations to 
obtain tobacco products at 
a lower price. 
- Also claimed that 
taxpayers’ money was 
being used to fund 
lobbying by public health 
groups. 
anti-tobacco positions, built 
support for industry positions 
throughout the labor 
movement, and provided 
general public 
communications. 
- Contributed to politicians 
and party committees (e.g. 
authors cite evidence of 
Philip Morris funnelling funds 
via a third party to Republican 
Governor, George Pataki). 
- Contributed funds to the 
think tank New York Citizens 
for a Sound Economy (a 
branch of Citizens for a 
Sound Economy, which 
advocates for lower taxes). 
- Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Company, Lorillard 
Tobacco Company and the 
New York Association of 
Convenience Stores 
launched a joint radio and 
print advertising campaign 
against the bill: ‘The 
advertisements provided a 
toll-free number to Lorillard, 
through which callers were 
given their senator’s contact 
information and patched 
through to their senator’s 
office to voice opposition.’ 
- In addition, Brown & 
siding with the LMC on 
the issue of smokefree 
worksites,’ the New 
York public sector 
unions did not tend to 
denounce proposals for 
cigarette tax increases. 
- The tobacco industry 
eventually gave up 
trying to win public 
sector union support on 
this issue, which authors 
decide was a ‘fatal 
error’. 
- ‘By the late 1990s […] 
most of labor in New 
York had shifted to 
support for anti-tobacco 
policies (shift in support 
started with excise but 
then moved on to other 
tobacco control issues). 
- A tax increase passed 
in 1993 as part of the 
budget, but the tax 
increase was lowered to 
17 cents (rather than 
the proposed 21 cents). 
- The 1999 bill passed, 
making New York’s 
cigarette tax the highest 
in the USA at the time (it 
was passed after 
evidence about Pataki’s 
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Williamson Tobacco 
Company contacted 
constituents directly and then 
connected interested 
individuals to their senator’s 
office. Some senators 
reported receiving several 
hundred calls each business 
day. Many callers were 
uninformed or misinformed as 
to the content of the bill; Jim 
Clancy, an aide to Senator 
Michael Breslin (D-Albany), 
stated: ‘Some callers were 
unaware that it [the tobacco 
tax increase] was tied to 
health insurance’ 
links to Philip Morris 
funding were revealed). 
- However, not as much 
of the revenue as 
tobacco control activists 
had hoped went to 
tobacco control 
measures, falling 
significantly short of the 
Center for Disease 
Control and 
Prevention’s 
recommendation of $95 
million. 
Epps-
Johnson, 
Barnes and 
Glantz, 
2009[32] 
Unclear. 6,9,10   Aim: Not stated but implies 
that the aim of the tobacco 
industry was to oppose 
various tax increases 
proposed in Iowa, USA. 
Context:  Focuses on state 
level efforts to introduce 
taxes in Iowa, USA (by 
legislature, rather than direct 
public vote). In relation to tax 
issues, focuses on period 
1981-2007. 
- Argued that raising the 
tax would mean that 
Iowans would travel to 
neighbouring states to buy 
cigarettes. 
- In 2007, argued that 
tobacco taxes were 
regressive, and 
disproportionately 
burdened Iowans of 
modest income. 
- Funded grassroots allies 
including retailers and tavern 
owners/managers. 
- Lobbied against proposed 
increases via the Tobacco 
Institute and pan-industry 
collaborations 
- Used personal contacts to 
exert influence. 
- Joined the Iowa Citizen 
Action Network, a Labor 
organisation including union 
groups, so that it would lobby 
on tobacco industry’s behalf. 
- Gave funds to at least one 
key policymaker: In 2006, the 
then Speaker of the House, 
Mixed:  
- The 1987 tax increase 
proposal was defeated; 
- In 1988, the tobacco 
industry helped ensure 
a ‘sunset clause’ was 
included; 
- In 1991, the tobacco 
industry failed and a tax 
increase was passed; 
- The tobacco industry 
then helped prevent any 
further tax increases for 
16 years; 
- In 2007, a $1 tobacco 
tax increase bill passed 
despite opposition. 
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Christopher Rants, ardently 
opposed any increase in the 
cigarette tax.  In his capacity 
as Speaker of the House, 
Rants controlled the 
legislative agenda and the 
referral of bills to committee, 
allowing him to control the 
fate of any tax increase 
measures.  Rep. Rants 
received $7,397 in tobacco 
industry campaign 
contributions between 1998 
and 2008, the most of any 
legislator in the Iowa General 
Assembly during that time 
period. 
- Promoted the need for 
sunset clauses (i.e. time-
limiting clauses) in relation to 
tax increases. 
Givel & 
Glantz, 
2001; Givel, 
2006; Givel, 
2007 
[33,34,35] 
- Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents, 
plus reviewed 
existing case studies 
of tobacco industry 
state level lobbying. 
- Also analyzed data 
on the status of state 
tobacco control 
legislation from the 
US Centers for 
Disease Control and 
Prevention, National 
1-3,5-10   Aim: Various but in relation 
to tobacco taxes, to oppose 
all tobacco excise tax 
increases proposed at state 
level in USA. 
Context: Focuses on 
tobacco industry efforts to 
influence state level 
legislatures (in various 
areas, not only in relation to 
tax) in the USA during the 
1990s, up to 2003. 
- Argued tobacco use is a 
matter of individual choice 
and it is therefore 
reasonable to expect 
freedom from excessive 
government regulations 
and taxes. 
- Framed issues as 
important because they 
impact on public / other 
sectors, rather than 
because they impact on 
the tobacco industry itself. 
For many of the lobbying 
tactics/mechanisms outlined, 
it is unclear if they are related 
to taxation. On the issue of 
tobacco excises specifically, 
the following are highlighted: 
- The tobacco industry 
worked with and funded anti-
tax groups; 
- The industry contributed 
funds to ‘national groups not 
directly related to tobacco 
that make policy 
- Found that twenty 
states had low levels of 
tobacco excise taxation 
(less than 25 cents per 
cigarette pack). 
Concludes this suggests 
tobacco industry has 
been able to maintain a 
favorable market 
environment (including 
in relation to tobacco 
excise taxes). 
- However, notes that 
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Center for Chronic 
Disease Prevention 
and Health 
Promotion, Office of 
Smoking and Health. 
- Supplemented this 
with data from the 
Coalition on Smoking 
or Health, American 
Lung Association, 
and Federation of 
Tax.  
- Analysis of relevant 
newspaper reports 
(Lexis Nexis) and 
relevant articles from 
the Americans for 
Nonsmokers’ Rights 
database 
(http://www.tidatabas
e.org/), magazine 
articles, web pages, 
journal articles, and 
books. 
- The NSA (a tobacco 
industry front group) 
argued that adult tobacco 
use should not be hindered 
by rigorous regulatory 
controls or higher tobacco 
taxes. 
- Called into ‘question the 
potential health effects of 
tobacco use and the 
viability of proposed 
tobacco tax increases’. 
- Presented smoking as 
‘socially acceptable for 
adults’. 
recommendations, which can 
effect state legislation while 
allowing the tobacco lobby to 
remain behind the scenes’, 
e.g., funding for Women 
Involved in Farm Economics 
(WIFE) and the National 
Taxpayers Conference 
(NTC). Both of these groups 
‘assisted the tobacco lobby 
[…] to fight tobacco excise 
tax increases’. 
- The tobacco industry 
formed relationships with 
minority and women’s 
political caucuses ‘to build 
coalitions to counter tobacco 
excise taxes and promote 
smokers’ rights legislation’. 
- Engaged in the ongoing 
employment of well 
established contract 
lobbyists, who are managed 
and coordinated in a top-
down manner by the tobacco 
industry: these ‘contract 
lobbyists often have decades 
of experience and expertise 
in working with state 
legislatures to advance or 
block legislation.’ 
- Provided direct and indirect 
campaign contributions, as 
well as gifts and honoraria to 
tobacco industry efforts 
to weaken or neutralize 
stronger tobacco 
regulations and taxes 
were effective ‘only for 
some campaigns.’ 
-  On the NSA 
specifically: ‘From 
January 1994 to June 
1999, the NSA’s record 
of political victories and 
shaping of public 
policies was mixed. At 
the national level, the 
NSA played an 
important supporting 
role in winning four 
major campaigns and 
losing one. At the state 
level, the NSA played 
an important supporting 
role in losing three 
campaigns and winning 
one. At the local level, 
the NSA played an 
important supporting 
role in winning 19 
campaigns and losing 
12.’ (NB not all 
campaigns concerned 
tax increases and 
authors do not specify 
which related to excise). 
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legislators; 
- Formed occasional alliances 
with other allied interest 
groups (such as the 
hospitality industry to counter 
clean indoor air ordinances); 
- Developed front groups, 
including the National 
Smokers Alliance (NSA), 
which allowed the tobacco 
industry and its political allies 
to act without being publicly 
associated with actions. NSA 
was particularly active in 
campaigning against tax 
increases. Burson-Marsteller, 
the public relations firm, 
helped set this up for Philip 
Morris (with some 
subsequent financial 
assistance from other 
tobacco companies) and 
some Burson-Marsteller staff 
worked for the NSA. 
- Tactics of the front groups 
often included orchestrated 
grassroots advocacy 
campaigns through the mail 
or via phone calls to pressure 
policymakers. This helped 
‘generate’ the appearance of 
public support. 
- Provided testimony to 
legislative bodies. 
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- Targeted University of 
California in San Francisco 
tobacco control researcher 
and Professor of Medicine, 
Stanton Glantz, alleging, but 
not proving, that Glantz 
misused grant funds for 
illegal political purposes and 
lobbying. 
- Filed a Senate ethics 
complaint against Senator 
John McCain, alleging he had 
used ‘his Senate franking 
privilege to bolster his run for 
the presidency’ (NB Philip 
Morris disagreed with this 
approach and withdrew 
financial assistance for NSA 
over this issue). 
Goldman & 
Glantz, 
1999; 
Goldman 
and Glantz, 
1998[36,37]   
Interviews with key 
informants and 
analysis of public 
documents, internal 
memoranda, and 
news reports. 
1-3,5-7,9,10   Aims: To prevent Measure 
44 becoming law, notably by 
preventing it from gaining a 
majority public vote. Ballot 
Measure 44 was a proposal 
to raise cigarette taxes in 
Oregon by US$0.30 per 
pack, and to earmark the 
funds to support an Oregon 
Health Plan and tobacco 
control (it proposed a 
dedicated 10% of the 
revenues would be used for 
tobacco control).  Once 
Measure 44 had passed, to 
- Taxing smokers to pay 
for healthcare for everyone 
is unfair. 
- Measure 44 contained no 
controls on how money 
would be spent and were 
likely to be wasted on 
bureaucracy, etc, rather 
than being spent on health 
care and health education; 
- Healthcare providers and 
insurance companies were 
being greedy in wanting 
these taxes and the money 
would merely be used to 
- Legally challenged the 
initiative on various grounds 
(language used; failure to 
specify all the types of taxes 
that would be raised; and 
claims that the summary was 
misleading). 
- ‘While signatures were 
being collected to qualify 
Measure 44 for the ballot, the 
tobacco industry began 
contributing money to a 
different ballot measure 
campaign’, which the authors 
suggest was designed ‘to 
- The legal challenge 
initially met with some 
success but was 
eventually ignored as 
submitted late. 
- Other tobacco industry 
lobbying efforts also 
initially met with some 
success but later failed. 
- Although the tobacco 
industry outspent 
Measure 44's 
supporters 7 to 1, the 
initiative passed with 
56% of the vote. 
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prevent earmarked funds 
from being spent on tobacco 
control programmes. 
Context: This study focuses 
on state-level efforts to 
achieve a tobacco tax 
increase in Oregon (by direct 
public vote), which was 
passed in 1996. Study 
largely focuses on industry 
activities in the period 
between mid-1980s and 
1997. Notes a tight fiscal 
situation, and a perceived 
need for healthcare funding 
may have increased support 
for the measure. Also notes 
those involved in promoting 
the measure were able to 
draw on experiences relating 
to similar policy proposals in 
other states (California, 
Massachusetts and Arizona) 
and that some of the 
consultants who had worked 
on successful California and 
Arizona initiatives were used 
in this campaign. 
 
line the pockets of the 
already-wealthy doctors, 
hospitals, and insurers, at 
the expense of all 
Oregonians. 
- The Measure would allow 
cuts in spending on 
programmes that were 
currently funded by 
tobacco tax. Authors say 
this was incorrect, 
explaining: What the 
(industry) adverts failed to 
explain was that the total 
amount of money going to 
programs which received 
funding from the existing 
cigarette tax would not 
change - the only 
difference was that the 
percentage of the cigarette 
tax funds they received 
would be proportionally 
smaller because the total 
revenue would be so much 
larger. 
 
disrupt the signature-
gathering process and to 
dilute support for Measure 44’ 
and ‘to divert the energy and 
financial resources of the 
health insurers away from 
Measure 44.’ The money the 
industry gave to this 
alternative campaign, meant 
the signature-gatherers could 
be paid significantly more 
than those for Measure 44, 
which led to more signature-
gatherers focusing on the 
other campaign.  The tobacco 
control lobby eventually had 
to pay more for signature 
collections. 
- The tobacco industry 
formed and funded a 
registered campaign 
committee, called Fairness 
Matters to Oregonians 
Committee (FMOC). Of the 
$4,614,292 in cash 
contributed to FMOC to fight 
for Measure 39 and against 
Measure 44, all but $30 came 
from the Tobacco Institute.  
- Much of the above money 
was used to run ads on radio, 
TV and via direct mail 
(tobacco industry significantly 
outspent the public health 
Largely unsuccessful: 
- The tobacco industry 
also failed to divert 
tobacco control funds to 
other uses or limit the 
scope of the 
programme. 
- Nevertheless, only 
10% of the revenues 
were devoted to 
tobacco control 
activities, even though 
public health groups 
provided 37% of the 
campaign money (notes 
that this was partly 
because public health 
groups were not 
involved in the early 
phases of the tobacco 
tax effort and therefore 
missed an opportunity 
to affect the allocation of 
funds). 
- Overall, article 
concludes: ‘Despite 
being outspent more 
than 7 to 1, Measure 44 
passed with 56% of the 
vote on 5 November 
1996.‘ ‘The end result 
was an 11% decline in 
per capita cigarette 
consumption in Oregon 
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campaigners on advertising). 
- The tobacco industry hid its 
involvement in some 
advertising campaigns 
(though advertisers were 
eventually required to declare 
this). 
- The tobacco industry hired a 
former Oregon governor. 
- Used the support of a 
dentist (i.e. medical care 
worker). 
- Once measure had been 
passed, the tobacco industry 
lobbied legislators about how 
the money should be spent, 
hoping to weaken tobacco 
control advertising 
programme. This included 
lobbying a Subcommittee 
which consisted of three 
senators and which had to 
(by majority) approve the 
budget. 
since 1996 and a 
decline of 35 000 in the 
number of Oregonians 
who smoke’. 
- Philip Morris 
concluded they ought to 
use third parties more 
heavily in future 
campaigns in order to 
make voters ‘more 
persuadable’ of their 
views. 
Heiser & 
Begay, 
1997; Koh, 
1996 [38,41] 
Analysis of 
documentary 
sources, including 
internal memos, 
meeting minutes, 
newspaper articles, 
other internal 
documents, letters, 
newsletters, news 
and press releases 
1-3,9,10   Aim: To challenge / 
undermine the development, 
then implementation of, 
Question 1, a proposal to 
raise the tobacco tax in 
Massachusetts by $0.25 and 
to earmark revenue to fund 
tobacco education 
programmes, in order to 
reduce smoking related 
- Cigarette tax is 
regressive and the 
increase would contribute 
to class warfare (argued 
the tax pitted upper middle 
class liberals, mostly white, 
against lower middle class 
working people, mostly 
minority); 
- The proposed tax would 
- The tobacco industry 
outspent the Coalition for a 
Healthy Future by 10:1. 
- Legally challenged the draft 
proposal (particularly 
earmarking of funds), on 
basis it violated the state 
constitution, and filed 
subsequent legal challenges 
at later stages. 
- The proposition 
passed so the tobacco 
industry failed to 
prevent it. 
- Legal challenges 
(including to 
earmarking) failed. 
- The tobacco industry 
failed to disrupt the 
signature gathering (two 
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(many of which were 
provided through the 
American Cancer 
Society). Also used 
available polling data 
and undertook some 
interviews (although 
these are not 
discussed in the 
‘Methods’ section). 
 
deaths in the state. 
Context: Focuses on a state 
level effort to increase 
tobacco taxes in 
Massachusetts, USA, by 
direct public vote which, 
passed in 1992 (enacted in 
1993). Focuses on period 
1990-1995.  
hurt the state economy, 
particularly small 
businesses, because it 
would increase cross-
border shopping; 
- The tax-generated 
monies would be diverted 
and legislature would use 
the extra money raised for 
purposes other than those 
intended (e.g. to balance 
budget); 
- The proposal was not 
legal. 
- Claimed the tax was 
unfair on smokers. 
- Used a signatures expert to 
try to disqualify signatures 
supporting the ballot 
proposal; 
- During the second required 
signature drive, the tobacco 
industry tried to disrupt 
matters by offering two 
compromises – both of which 
involved smaller tax increase, 
with fewer funds being 
allocated to tobacco control 
programmes; 
- Undertook a major 
advertising initiative (TV, 
radio and direct mail) to 
garner public support for 
opposing initiative, stepping 
up the campaign in final 
weeks before vote. 
- The tobacco industry 
organised and funded a 
group to lobby against the tax 
increases, called ‘The 
Committee Against Unfair 
Taxes’ 
- Focused on framing 
debates about taxes 
generically, rather than 
tobacco taxes specifically. 
- Employed a key former 
legislator. 
- In collaboration with the 
tobacco industry, an ultra-
rounds). In round one, 
the sheer volume put 
tobacco industry off 
questioning signatures. 
Later, a signatures 
expert was unable to 
disqualify enough 
signatures to challenge 
the ballot. 
- The tobacco industry 
alternative proposal was 
largely ignored. 
- However, tobacco 
industry advertisement 
campaign was effective 
in shifting public 
opinion, according to 
poll data. 
- And earmarked funds 
were subsequently 
diverted, with only just 
over 25% being spent 
on tobacco education, 
apparently justifying one 
of the tobacco industry’s 
arguments. Koh’s study 
claims more than $220 
million was diverted 
form the tobacco 
education account, and 
that this was a result of 
tobacco industry 
pressure. This prompted 
a subsequent round of 
Study Methods Critical 
Appraisal* 
Key findings in relation to tobacco industry (TI) efforts to influence tobacco tax policies 
 
Aim of the TI & context            Arguments used                     Tactics employed                    Success of TI 
conservative, out of state 
Catholic organisation was 
persuaded to distribute 
thousands of letters claiming 
that the Q1 funds would be 
used to fund abortion 
counselling and condom 
distribution in schools. 
lawsuits. 
Hendlin, 
Barnes and 
Glantz, 
2008[39] 
Unclear, though 
employs tobacco 
industry documents 
and interview 
evidence. 
6   Aim: To stop the following 
proposals for tobacco tax 
increases in Arizona, USA: 
- Proposition 200 in 1994 
(proposal to increase the 
tobacco tax by 58 cents and 
earmark some of the 
revenue to create a tobacco 
control program in Arizona); 
- Proposition 303 in 2002 
(proposal to increase the 
tobacco tax from 60 cents to 
$1.18 and use additional 
revenue for healthcare costs 
programme); 
- Proposition 203 in 2006 
(proposal for a further 
substantial tobacco tax 
increase, taking the total to 
$2, with 80 cents of this 
increase providing revenue 
to create a new, early 
childhood care program in 
Arizona, including preschool, 
medical care, and day-care). 
Context: Focuses on a 
- In relation to Proposition 
200, the tobacco industry 
convinced the restaurant 
and licensed beverage 
associations and several 
chambers of commerce to 
oppose the proposal on 
the basis it would be bad 
for business.  
- In relation to Proposition 
303, the tobacco industry 
argued the tax would 
unfairly target the poor and 
create a black market for 
cigarettes. 
- In relation to Proposition 
303, groups allied with the 
tobacco industry argued 
that a tobacco tax increase 
would bring cigarette 
smuggling and that forcing 
smokers to pay for others’ 
healthcare constituted an 
unfair burden.   
- In relation to Proposition 
203, the tobacco industry 
- The Tobacco Institute paid 
dues to the Arizona Licensed 
Beverage Association, the 
Arizona Restaurant and 
Hospitality Association, The 
Arizona Retail Grocers 
Association, the Arizona 
Retailers Association, the 
Tucson Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Arizona 
Tax Research Association 
throughout the 1990s. These 
organisations generally allied 
with the tobacco industry for 
specific issues, usually 
around elections. 
- In relation to Proposition 
303, groups allied with the 
tobacco industry, including 
the Cato Institute and the 
Arizona Tax Research 
Association (both which 
received tobacco industry 
money), wrote opinion 
editorials warning that a 
tobacco tax increase would 
Unsuccessful: 
- Proposition 200 
passed in 1994, 
increasing the tobacco 
tax by 40 cents, with 
23% of the additional 
revenue being used to 
create Arizona’s 
Tobacco Education and 
Prevention Program 
(TEPP) and 70% to 
Arizona’s Medicaid 
programme. 
- Proposition 303 
passed in 2002, with 
most of the additional 
funds being used for 
healthcare programmes 
(though the Proposition 
also included some 
protection for the 
existing use of tobacco 
tax revenue for tobacco 
control programmes). 
- Proposition 203 
passed in 2006. 
Study Methods Critical 
Appraisal* 
Key findings in relation to tobacco industry (TI) efforts to influence tobacco tax policies 
 
Aim of the TI & context            Arguments used                     Tactics employed                    Success of TI 
series of efforts to pass state 
level tax increases in 
Arizona, by direct public 
vote. Focuses on period 
1997-2007. 
argued that cigarette taxes 
are regressive and that this 
proposal would unfairly 
burden the poor, that no 
logical link exists between 
taxing smokers and paying 
for early childhood 
education (meaning 
smokers would be unfairly 
shouldering a 
disproportionate share of 
childcare costs) and that 
funding early childhood 
education with a tobacco 
tax was fiscally 
irresponsible.  
lead to more cigarette 
smuggling and that forcing 
smokers to pay for others’ 
healthcare constituted an 
unfair burden.  However, the 
tobacco industry itself did not 
provide any significant 
opposition to the tax increase 
in 2002. 
- In relation to Proposition 
203, two other tobacco 
control proposals were on the 
table, including proposals for 
a state-wide smoke-free 
policy, and the tobacco 
industry largely concentrated 
on trying to stop this, rather 
than fighting the tax proposal 
(or both measures 
simultaneously). Hence, 
tobacco industry activities to 
prevent Proposition 203 were 
limited. Phillip Morris focused 
primarily on fighting tobacco 
taxes and RJ Reynolds 
focused primarily on fighting 
smoke-free legislation. 
However, Phillip Morris did 
not invest significant 
resources into its campaign.  
Nevertheless, some 
opposition was evident, e.g. 
the brother of the president of 
the Arizona Tax Research 
However, it 
inadvertency decreased 
tobacco tax revenue for 
TEPP (although this 
was attributed to the 
legislation being 
pursued by non-tobacco 
control interests, rather 
than as a result of 
tobacco industry 
efforts). 
Study Methods Critical 
Appraisal* 
Key findings in relation to tobacco industry (TI) efforts to influence tobacco tax policies 
 
Aim of the TI & context            Arguments used                     Tactics employed                    Success of TI 
Association (an organisation 
with a history of receiving 
tobacco industry funding) 
openly criticised the proposal 
for unfairly burdening the 
poor. 
- Tobacco industry worked to 
divert revenue away from 
tobacco control programmes. 
Kelton & 
Givel, 
2008[40] 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents, 
newspaper reports, 
journal articles, 
scholarly reports, 
court cases, 
government data, 
court testimony, and 
federal and state 
statutes and 
regulations, plus 
relevant information 
from websites.  
1,2,4-7,9,10   Aim: To maintain/expand 
sales in Canada despite tax 
increases and to use the 
issue of smuggling as part of 
campaign to reduce taxes. 
Context: Focuses on efforts 
to influence tobacco taxation 
in Canada (federal level) 
over period 1980-2000. 
- The tobacco industry 
blamed rampant smuggling 
on excessive taxation. 
- The tobacco industry 
‘promoted smuggling 
schemes’ not only to 
‘increase profits’ but also to 
‘provide an argument for 
tobacco taxation reduction.’ 
Effectively, the tobacco 
industry ‘secretly pushed for 
increased tobacco smuggling 
so that it could argue against 
higher taxes as a motivation 
to smuggle.’ 
- ‘Because of the federal 
excise and export tax breaks 
that apply on U.S. Native 
American land, for more than 
10 years the tobacco industry 
utilised this land as 
smuggling routes to avoid 
newly imposed Canadian 
taxes on tobacco products. 
By 1993, this tobacco 
smuggling accounted for 30 
to 40 percent of the total 
Canadian tobacco market.’ 
Successful: 
- Smuggling hindered 
Canadian tobacco tax 
increases from 
furthering a consistent 
reduction in 
consumption rates in 
1990s. 
- ‘The Canadian 
government responded 
to the influx of smuggled 
tobacco that culminated 
after the tax increases 
by, in 1994, returning 
taxes to their original 
level.’ Authors claim that 
this did not reduce 
smuggling and that it did 
increase smoking rates. 
Also claim the 
government lost 
revenue as a result. 
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Landman 
and Bialick, 
2004[42] 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents. 
1-6   Aims: To prevent the 
passage of the following 
proposals for tax increases 
in Colorado, USA (some of 
which it was proposed would 
be earmarked for health-
related issues): 
- A 1990 tax increase of 25 
cents per pack; 
- A 1992 tax increase of 35 
cents; 
- A 1994 tax increase. 
Context: Focuses on state 
level efforts to increase 
tobacco taxes in Colorado, 
US, by direct popular vote in 
the 1990s.  
- In relation to the 1990 
initiative, the tobacco 
industry commissioned a 
research company to 
undertake a survey to find 
which arguments would 
most effectively persuade 
voters to oppose the tax.  
This found that the three 
most powerful arguments 
motivating people against 
the tax were: (i) most of 
the revenue would be 
spent in the Denver area; 
(ii) the idea that a high 
percentage of the tax 
would go to a particular 
hospital in the Denver 
area; and (iii) that the tax 
would increase at a greater 
rate than inflation each 
year. 
- In relation to the 1994 
initiative, the tobacco 
industry claimed that 
supporters of the tax, 
including voluntary non-
profit groups, just wanted 
to boost their personal and 
organisational wealth. Also 
claimed bureaucrats would 
misspend the revenue 
raised by the tax increase 
and that the proposals 
- In 1990, tobacco companies 
joined forces to fight the 
proposal by jointly funding a 
Denver office called the 
Colorado Executive 
Committee. The tobacco 
industry also challenged the 
legal title of the initiative, and 
then the validity of the 
signatures gathered in 
support of the initiative. 
- In 1992, the tobacco 
industry once again began 
pouring funds into the 
Colorado Executive 
Committee to fight any tax 
increase that might 
materialise. 
- In 1994, the tobacco 
industry realised it was losing 
public credibility and started 
working to disguise its 
involvement in anti-ballot 
initiative campaigns and hide 
its opposition to smoking 
restriction and tax measures 
by funnelling opposition 
through more credible allies. 
- Philip Morris tried to reframe 
the issue as being about 
fairness and effective tax 
policy. 
- The tobacco industry also 
tried to identify ‘persuadable 
Successful: 
The tobacco industry 
had been successful in 
opposing tax increases 
in Colorado for many 
years (throughout the 
1970s and 1980s) and 
its efforts in early 1990s 
were also successful: 
- 1990: ballot defeated 
- 1992:  no ballot ever 
materialised 
- 1994: ballot defeated. 
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represented ‘an 
unwarranted exercise of 
state power’. Claimed the 
measure would fuel 
rampant waste and abuse 
in government.  Also 
framed the tax increase as 
‘picking on smokers,’ 
claimed that other groups 
would subsequently be 
targeted by government if 
the tax is permitted and 
claimed that the increase 
constituted ‘prohibition in 
disguise’. 
- The industry also 
targeted messages at 
smokers telling them that 
they were being singled 
out to ‘pay for programs 
that are the responsibility 
of the entire state.’ 
- In response to Colorado’s 
1994 tax effort, and to 
address a cigarette tax 
increase proposed in 
Arizona at the same time, 
R.J. Reynolds 
clandestinely formed a 
group called the National 
Coalition Against Crime 
and Tobacco Smuggling 
(NCACTC). 
- Generally refers to the 
voters’ and convey ‘potential 
issues of waste, fraud and 
abuse to them in a manner 
which identifies with their 
natural proclivity to oppose 
taxes and distrust 
government’. 
- Employed surveys to 
determine the most potent 
arguments that would sway 
voters to oppose the tax, and 
then deploying these 
arguments widely through 
television, radio and 
newspapers. 
- Tried to reach ‘persuadable’ 
voters via a telephone ‘push 
poll.’ 
- The industry disseminated 
arguments through allies, to 
disguise their origin. 
- Tobacco industry created a 
front group with the 
appearance of being a 
spontaneous, large-scale, 
citizen-led opposition to the 
tax, called ‘Citizens Against 
Tax Abuse and Government 
Waste.’ 
- The industry recruited and 
paid credible individuals to 
draw media attention to the 
idea that an increased 
cigarette tax would 
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tobacco industry 
employing a strategy of 
fostering mistrust and 
anger towards state 
government, to break 
down citizens’ confidence 
in the political system. 
exacerbate smuggling. 
- Considered placing a 
competing initiative on the 
Colorado’s ballot that would 
increase the cigarette tax, but 
by a lesser amount than 
public health advocates 
proposed.  The industry’s 
initiative would also have put 
the tax revenues toward 
prison construction or 
programs to reduce gang 
violence instead of health or 
tobacco prevention and 
education. 
- More generally, the study 
refers to the tobacco industry 
throwing parties and events 
for Senators and Governors, 
and offering free tickets to 
events, dinners etc, in order 
to garner support / favours. 
Lum and 
Glantz, 
2008[44] 
Unclear. 1,6,9,10   Aim: To stop Measure 50 
from becoming law in 
Oregon in 2007.  Measure 
50 proposed establishing the 
Healthy Kids Program to 
provide health insurance 
coverage for uninsured 
children via an additional 
84.5 cents tax on the 
existing $1.18 tax per 
cigarette pack and a 30% 
increase in the tax on other 
- Philip Morris and RJ 
Reynolds (RJR) ran 
separate campaigns 
against Measure 50 but 
both used similar 
messages, including 
arguing that the tax was 
regressive and would not 
support the Healthy Kids 
program, that the money 
would be diverted, that 
lawmakers were 
- RJR formed the 
‘Oregonians Against the 
Blank Check’ political action 
committee (PAC) and Philip 
Morris formed the ‘Stop the 
Measure 50 Tax Hike’ PAC 
with the Oregon Secretary of 
State. 
- Campaign finance records 
show that RJR paid $58,000 
to PAC for their survey work, 
and another $138,000 to 
Successful: 
- Measure 50 was 
defeated. 
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tobacco products. 
Context: Focuses on a state 
level initiative to increase 
tobacco tax in Oregon, US, 
by direct public vote. The 
study focuses on activities 
during 2007. 
unaccountable, and that a 
constitutional amendment 
was not the appropriate 
vehicle for a tobacco tax 
increase. 
- The RJR campaign 
focused more heavily on 
implicating health staff and 
health insurers and on 
emphasising the 
unsustainable and 
unaccountable nature of 
the Measure. The main 
arguments that RJR made 
was that health staff and 
health insurers would ‘get 
millions in new insurance 
business from taxpayers 
with no competitive bids’ 
and that ‘70% of the funds 
from the new tax would not 
go to the Healthy Kids 
Program.’ 
- The Philip Morris 
campaign highlighted 
government bureaucracies 
and inefficiencies, as well 
as querying the 
amendment of the 
Constitution with a product 
tax. 
Washington, DC-based 
Voter/Consumer Research 
for additional surveys and 
focus groups throughout the 
campaign. 
- Like RJ Reynolds’ 
campaign, ‘Stop the Measure 
50 Tax Hike’ relied mainly on 
paid media advertising and a 
website called 
measure50facts.com. 
- During the campaign, Philip 
Morris spent $237,575 on 
surveys and polls. 
- Approximately 67% of both 
tobacco companies’ 
campaign money was spent 
on paid media adverts on 
radio and broadcast and 
cable television. 
- The tobacco industry also 
contributed to senators’ 
campaign costs. 
- Taxpayer groups, such as 
the Taxpayer Association of 
Oregon and Freedomworks, 
and convenience store 
groups took the lead on 
encouraging the public to 
vote against the 84.5-cent 
tobacco tax increase. (NB 
article does not make it clear 
whether tobacco industry 
funded these groups.) 
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- The Smokers Club, Inc, a 
smokers’ rights group based 
on the internet, contributed to 
the grassroots efforts with 
their ‘Oregon Cash Cow 
Protest’ and made window 
flyers and handouts available 
on their website for 
downloading that urged 
smokers to ‘let them tax 
someone else for a change!’ 
Lum, 
Barnes, & 
Glantz, 
2009[45] 
Analyzed proposed 
ballot measures in 
USA states (used 
various documentary 
sources) and tobacco 
industry documents. 
Used public and 
private polls 
(obtained from 
proponents of the 
ballot measures, 
pollster websites or 
the tobacco industry 
documents) to 
identify early levels of 
support for the tax 
proposals and how 
this support 
compared with the 
final election 
outcomes. 
1-3,5-10   Aim: To avoid tobacco 
excise tax increases and, in 
particular, to avoid 
earmarked taxes at State 
level in the USA. 
Context: Focuses on 
tobacco industry strategies 
to oppose direct public vote 
initiatives at state level in the 
USA, during the period 
1988-2007. 
- Argued proposed tax 
increases did not dedicate 
enough to tobacco control 
and that hospitals and 
health maintenance 
organisations would profit 
(i.e. ‘only a small amount 
of the tax increase will go 
to education about the 
hazards of smoking.’). 
- After doing market 
research on the issue, 
sought to present tobacco 
taxes as part of broader 
tax rise issues. 
- Argued tax increases 
were ‘unfair’ 
- Built on popular themes 
of ‘anti-tax/ HMO scheme’ 
and ‘what they aren’t 
telling you’ as effective 
arguments against ballot 
measures. 
- The tobacco industry 
developed a voter 
segmentation model to 
determine which tobacco tax 
increases it could defeat in 
USA states. 
- The Tobacco Institute […] 
organised its Tobacco 
Industry Ballot Issues 
Committee, which provided 
‘oversight of all prevention, 
preparation, and execution of 
tactics relating to ballot 
issues, as well as the place to 
discuss new strategies and 
technologies related to 
battles in this arena.’ 
- The tobacco industry was 
advised to: lobby legislatures 
to ‘reform initiative and 
referendum laws to make 
qualification of ballot issues 
more difficult’, ‘encourage 
Mixed: 
- ‘The industry 
effectively influenced 
early voters.’ 
- Tobacco tax ballot 
measures commonly 
allocated substantial 
funds to medical 
services, despite lack of 
public support for this.  
- Between 1988 and 
1998 the tobacco 
industry mounted 
extensive opposition 
campaigns to all nine 
tobacco tax ballot 
measures that were 
proposed, but only 
defeated four (44%) of 
them. From 1998 to 
2008 it only challenged 
five out of 13 of the 
tobacco tax measures 
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third party ballot issues which 
threaten […] opposition and 
impede their progress’, mount 
‘legal challenges which 
complicate opposition 
progress’, and prevent ‘the 
opposition from using 
inappropriate funding sources 
for their political activities’. 
- The tobacco industry also 
conducted public relations 
campaigns, conducted 
benchmark research and built 
partnerships with other 
organisations that might be 
needed in a campaign. 
- In the 2000s, the industry 
became much more selective 
in which campaigns it 
opposed (although, after 
deciding not to fight the tax 
proposals in Washington, it 
did also realize that not 
opposing such increases was 
likely to encourage states to 
take action so began also 
taking this into consideration.) 
- Drew on its ‘essentially 
unlimited financial resources’. 
and defeated four (so 
80% of those it 
challenged). So it is 
becoming more 
successful in campaigns 
it conducts but probably 
at least partially 
because it has become 
more selective. 
- Claims the tobacco 
industry ‘learned to 
combine the argument 
that the tax would 
primarily benefit 
hospitals and HMOs 
with lack of funding for 
benefits for smokers. 
When either of the two 
arguments was used 
alone, the tobacco 
industry lost three out of 
four elections, but when 
they were combined, 
they won three out of 
four elections.’  
- Claims tobacco 
industry spending alone 
does not explain 
outcomes of state 
proposals to increase 
tobacco taxes. 
Moon, 
Males, & 
Nelson, 
Methodology is not 
described but the 
article appears to be 
1,9,10   Aim: To prevent a proposal 
for a state-wide tobacco tax 
initiative in Montana, USA, 
- The tax was framed as ‘a 
trap set by 'special 
interests' to subsidise 
- Opponents to proposal 
‘operated under the name 
‘Citizens Against More Tax 
Successful: 
- On November 6, 1990, 
Montana voters 
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1993[46] based on an analysis 
of various data 
sources, including 
media coverage of 
the issue and other 
academic articles. 
which would have added an 
extra $0.25 to cigarettes and 
earmarked this for tobacco 
control programmes. 
Context: Focuses on state 
level efforts to pass a 
tobacco tax increase in 
Montana, US, by ballot. 
Focuses on period from late 
1980s until 1990. Notes 
there was a lack of support 
from local medical and 
educational organisations for 
this initiative. 
 
those people who live in 
cities’. 
- Tobacco industry 
highlighted that passage of 
the initiative would give 
Montana the highest 
cigarette tax in the nation. 
and Bureaucracy’’ and they 
‘had $1.47 million at their 
disposal.’ ‘[M]ore than 88% of 
the money came from Philip 
Morris, RJR, Brown & 
Williamson, and the Tobacco 
Institute.’ 
- While the initiative was still 
in draft form, opponents 
conducted numerous 
telephone tracking surveys to 
measure the possible impact 
of various campaign themes. 
Increased state taxes and 
bureaucracy emerged as 
pivotal issues, and extensive 
television, radio, and 
newspaper advertisements 
emphasised these concerns.’ 
- Brochures were sent to 
businesses asking whether 
the business could afford the 
increase. 
- Multiple mailings were sent 
to voters from a Helena 
tobacco retailer portraying the 
increased tax as ‘a trap set 
by 'special interests' to 
subsidise those people who 
live in cities.’ 
- ‘The Montana Alliance for 
Progressive Policy (MAPP), a 
liberal group opposing the 
increase as an unfair tax on 
defeated Initiative 115 
by 59% to 41%. 
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poor people, received 
$22,500 from a tobacco 
industry lobby group to 
produce and send brochures 
to its 50,000 members urging 
rejection’. 
- Linked the proposed 
increase tobacco tax with 
proposed property tax 
increases in rural areas that 
were happening at the same 
time (so framed as part of 
broader debates about tax 
rises); 
- Undertook adverts during 
the last week of the 
campaign, which built on 
above (informing voters that 
although they could not do 
anything about outrageous 
property taxes, they could 
vote against the ‘selective 
sales tax increase’). 
Morley, 
Cummings, 
Hyland, 
Giovino, & 
Horan, 
2002[47] 
Analyzed tobacco 
industry expenditures 
by state, using data 
from tobacco industry 
document websites, 
and tobacco industry 
publication the Tax 
burden on tobacco. 
Also collected 
cigarette excise tax 
levels per pack for 
1-6,8   Aim: Not clearly specified, 
but findings suggest the 
industry was particularly 
concerned about policy 
developments that were 
likely to lead to increased 
cigarette taxes and 
earmarked cigarette taxes in 
1990s at State level in US. 
Context: Focuses on 
Tobacco Institute lobbying in 
Not assessed in this 
article. 
The findings from this study 
support the hypothesis that in 
the 1990s tobacco control 
activities such as raising 
cigarette excise taxes, 
attracted tobacco industry 
resources to undermine these 
efforts. 
- California and New York 
were ranked highest in 
average Tobacco Institute 
Not assessed in this 
article (although authors 
note the Tobacco 
Institute was disbanded 
in 1998, which suggests 
it was not seen as 
successful at this point). 
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each state for 1991 
and 1997, to rank 
states on the basis of 
increases in excise 
tax levels over this 
period. 
relation to state level 
tobacco control activities 
(including but not only 
tobacco tax increases) in the 
USA, between 1991 and 
1997. 
spending, and Minnesota, 
Arizona and Massachusetts 
also ranked highly (all states 
that had had public ballots on 
raising tobacco excise taxes 
and dedicated some of the 
increased revenue to tobacco 
control).  
- On the whole, study finds 
Tobacco Institute spending 
correlated with state efforts to 
introduce higher (often 
earmarked) tobacco excise 
taxes as well as to introduce 
other tobacco control 
measures such as public 
smoking restrictions 
(relationship was stronger for 
tobacco industry activities 
relating to tobacco tax than 
smoking restrictions, which 
authors suggest may be 
because the tobacco industry 
relied more on third parties to 
lobby against smoking 
restrictions than it did on 
tobacco excise issue). 
Raebeck, 
Campbell, & 
Balbach, 
2009[48] 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents 
and academic 
articles. 
1-3,5-7,9,10   Aims: The goals of the LMC 
(see above) included 
lobbying elected officials, 
discouraging liberal and 
labor groups from taking 
anti-tobacco positions, and 
building support for industry 
- Argued excise taxes are  
regressive and suggested 
they were therefore unfair; 
 
-- Framed discussions of 
tobacco taxes as part of 
debates about broader, 
‘consumer’ excise taxes. 
-  Framed issues so that they 
would be more appealing to 
labor and minority groups 
- The tobacco industry 
did appear to be 
successful in influencing 
the position on tobacco 
excise of some key 
African and American 
and Latino Labor 
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positions among organized 
labor in the USA. Notes 
tobacco taxes and smoke-
free legislation were seen to 
be most effective at reducing 
smoking rates (and implies 
that these were perceived by 
the Tobacco Institute to be 
the biggest threats). 
Context: The study focuses 
on examining the 
development of “the excise 
coalition” between the 
tobacco industry and African 
and American and Latino 
Labor Organizations in the 
USA during the period 
1980s-1998. Largely focuses 
on federal level activities. 
which the tobacco industry 
was trying to work with, e.g. 
presented policies (tobacco 
taxation increases and 
smokefree legislation) as 
particularly detrimental to 
organised labor and, 
specifically, to ‘people of 
color’. 
- Provided significant funding 
to African and American and 
Latino Labor Organisations 
and also sponsored special 
projects within these 
organisations, including 
studies, brochures, and 
conference events. 
- Helped support these 
organisations’ priorities, even 
where they did not directly 
relate to tobacco. 
- To facilitate working with 
these kinds of labor groups, 
the Tobacco Institute 
established the Tobacco 
Industry Labor Management 
Committee (LMC) in 1984 
(see above). 
- The Tobacco Institute then 
used the coalitions it had 
formed with these 
organisations ‘to appeal to 
politicians who were 
traditionally more responsive 
Organisations (notes at 
least one key group 
appeared to shift its 
position on tobacco 
control issues between 
1984 and 1988). This is 
despite the fact that 
other research the 
authors cite indicates 
these groups’ core 
population 
constituencies did 
support tobacco tax 
increases. 
- According to a 1990 
Institute briefing, the 
LMC’s use of allies, 
such as the African and 
American and Latino 
Labor Organisations it 
was supporting, 
‘’demonstrate[d] to 
legislators - particularly 
the liberal Democrats 
[sic] who are most likely 
to support increases to 
fund social programs - 
that consumer excise 
taxes are: Unfair 
Regressive Inconsistent 
with tax reform.’  
- In 1993, when 
Clinton’s health care 
plan included a $1 per 
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to such arguments, 
specifically Democrats, 
liberals, and politicians of 
color.’ 
- ‘The Institute, through the 
LMC, supported the release 
of studies, letters, and op-eds 
opposing excise taxes. These 
were often credited to the 
labor organisations that the 
tobacco industry was 
supporting via the LMC, 
rather than to the tobacco 
industry, even though they 
were ‘usually written by the 
Institute or its consultants’. 
- The Tobacco Institute paid a 
PR firm, Ogilvy, Adams & 
Rinehart, to help write a 
publication that was officially 
by one of the labor 
organisations it was 
supporting, called, ‘Fair 
Taxes: Still a Dream for 
African-Americans’, and then 
promoted it to ‘the black and 
labor media’. 
- The tobacco industry paid 
for studies that highlighted 
regressive nature of 
consumer taxes (framing 
tobacco taxes as part of this) 
and its impact on these 
groups (e.g. industry 
pack cigarette tax, the 
Tobacco Institute 
mobilized these groups 
to lobby the 
Congressional Black 
and Hispanic Caucuses, 
respectively. 
- Claims the tobacco 
industry’s ‘reframing of 
ideas was particularly 
successful because the 
points were valid – i.e. 
excise taxes are 
regressive.’ 
- Authors conclude: 
‘Whether the 
involvement of [these 
organizations] had a 
significant impact on 
tobacco policy decisions 
is unclear, but both 
organizations had 
political influence 
among policymakers, 
organized labor, and 
people of color.’ 
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sponsored study claimed ‘An 
African-American family, with 
both parents working, two 
children and an income of 
$25,000, will pay an almost 
six times larger share of its 
income on federal consumer 
excise taxes than a family 
making $250,000 a year’). 
Spivak and 
Givel, 
2005[49] 
Unclear. 5,6   Aim: To defeat/avoid various 
proposals to increase 
tobacco taxes in Oklahoma, 
USA, including a proposal in 
2001-2004 for a $1 per pack 
increase. 
Context: Focuses on state 
level efforts to increase 
tobacco taxes by legislative 
and direct public vote action 
in Oklahoma, US, between 
1983 and 2005. 
- In 1988, claimed that 
further tax increases would 
cause reduced tax 
revenues as a result of 
decreasing legitimate sales 
and rising illicit sales. Also 
claimed that the revenues 
of grocers and other 
retailers would be affected.  
Argued that a tobacco tax 
increase would 
disproportionately affect 
low-income households, 
including elderly 
households. 
- In 2001 and 2002, 
tobacco industry 
representatives argued 
that the tax increase would 
mean smokers would 
instead purchase their 
tobacco products from 
Native American reserves 
(which have tax breaks), 
bordering states and the 
- The tobacco industry 
worked collaboratively with 
industry lobbyists and the 
Tobacco Institute. 
- Tried to generate helpful 
grassroots contacts with 
legislators. 
-  In March 1993, Lorillard 
Tobacco Company sent 
notices to Tobacco Action 
Network (TAN) volunteers in 
Oklahoma, informing them 
that the Oklahoma Senate 
was considering a bill that 
would increase the tobacco 
excise.  The letter 
encouraged volunteers to 
write to or telephone state 
legislators to express 
opposition to the bill and 
encourage them to vote ‘no’. 
Letter provided volunteers 
with the name, address and 
telephone number of their 
state senator and listed 
Mixed: 
- Oklahoma raised the 
cigarette tax in 1987 
from 18 to 23 cents. 
- For seventeen years 
from 1987-2003, the 
tobacco industry 
effectively squashed all 
proposals to increase 
tobacco taxes (in 1994, 
Tobacco Institute 
declared that due to 
their lobbying efforts, 
‘for the past seven 
years, under both 
Republican and 
Democratic governors, 
proposed tobacco tax 
increases have been 
repeatedly defeated.’) 
- Finally, in 2004 a ballot 
for a 55 cent tax 
increase per pack 
passed. The 
referendum eliminated 
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Internet. Also suggested 
illicit trade would increase. 
These arguments were 
reiterated in 2004. 
- In 2003, claimed 
traditional retailers would 
be unfairly treated if tax 
increase resulted in 
disparity between their 
products and the Native 
American reserve shops. 
- In 2004, a spokeswoman 
for Philip Morris again 
suggested illicit trade 
would increase and that 
this would make it easier 
for children to obtain 
cigarettes. 
points that could be made in 
opposing the tax increase. 
- Used lobbying groups, 
including the Tobacco 
Institute, to help glean 
‘advance information as to 
the exact nature of the 
tobacco tax proposals’ and 
persuade ‘key legislative 
leaders that the plans are 
unsound.’ 
- Used ‘a large number of 
grassroots contacts’’ to target 
legislative leadership and 
executive department 
personnel with telephone 
calls and protest mail (worked 
via tax activists and via 
phone bank operations). RJR 
and Philip Morris were 
involved in separate 
campaigns using these 
techniques (RJR’s worked via 
a front group called 
Oklahoma Smokers’ Rights). 
- Considered undertaking a 
media tour using tobacco 
industry economists. 
- Sought support from 
organised labor groups, 
members of the Oklahoma 
Association of Tobacco and 
Candy Distributors, as well as 
other industries subject to 
the 25 cent state sales 
tax on cigarettes and 
increased the excise tax 
by 80 cents, from 23 
cents to $1.03, creating 
a net tax increase of 55 
cents. 
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excise taxes. 
- In 2004, provided support 
(personnel and at least $1.7 
million in financial support) for 
a campaign to defeat tax 
increase proposal. 
Stanton, 
Barnes and 
Glantz, 
2009[50] 
Not stated. 5-7   Aim: Not stated but implies 
that the tobacco industry 
wanted to defeat various 
proposals to increase 
tobacco tax in Maine, US, 
between mid-1990s and 
2008, notably: 
- 1997 proposal to double 
tobacco tax from 37 cents to 
74 cents 
- 2001 proposal to increase 
tobacco tax to $1 per pack 
- 2005 proposal to double 
tobacco tax to from $1 to $2 
per pack. 
Some proposals for 
increases included proposals 
for earmarking revenue for 
health care funding. 
Context: Focuses on state 
level efforts to increase 
tobacco taxes in Maine, 
USA, by legislative action. In 
relation to tobacco industry 
efforts to influence this, 
focuses on period 1997-
2001. 
- Study says that tobacco 
industry and allies planned 
to demonstrate that there 
would be negative 
economic impacts as a 
result of increased cross-
border trade and that 
teenagers would travel to 
neighbouring states to buy 
cigarettes (although it is 
unclear whether these 
arguments were used). 
-  Also says the industry 
planned to produce a 
finance study to support 
claim that tobacco taxes 
were the least reliable and 
most regressive method of 
health care funding. 
- Grassroots members of the 
Tobacco Action Network 
(TAN) were encouraged to 
monitor and campaign 
against cigarette taxes 
- In the late 1980s, TAN 
members formed the group 
Mainers Against Prohibiting 
Smoking (MAPS) in response 
to the increase in the number 
of tobacco control bills. They 
focused on organised 
mailings, letter to the editor 
campaigns, and pro-smoker 
speeches at public hearings. 
- In 1997, Philip Morris 
worked with other allies, 
including the Maine Grocer’s 
Association and RJR, to 
encourage opposition to the 
proposed tobacco tax 
increases. 
- The tobacco industry used 
lobbyists to help encourage 
public opposition; directly 
lobbied legislators; provided 
supportive expert testimony; 
encouraged third party and 
Mixed: 
- ‘In 1995, 5 bills to raise 
the tobacco excise tax 
were defeated. Each of 
the bills would have 
increased the tax by 
between 5 and 38 
cents, and they planned 
to allocate the revenues 
to healthcare programs’. 
- In 1997, a tax increase 
to 74 cents when ahead 
and this was partially 
used to establish a 
tobacco prevention and 
control program (the 
increase provided the 
first state funding for 
tobacco control in 
Maine). 
- In 2001, the proposed 
tax increase also went 
ahead. 
- In 2005, the proposed 
tax increase went 
ahead, although only 
after several other bills 
had failed, including a 
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grassroots support (this 
included encouraging the 
Maine Grocers Association 
and the Maine Oil Dealers to 
act ‘as messengers for the 
industry’); disseminated 
research to support claims 
about the futility of tobacco 
tax increases; and undertook 
polling and various public 
relations strategies (including 
writing op-eds and letters to 
the editor in mass media 
outlets). 
- The tobacco industry also 
helped create a cross-sector 
lobbying group called the 
‘Eagle Team,’ which included 
tobacco industry 
representatives, Maine US 
Senator George Mitchell’s 
niece and Ellen Bickmore of 
the Maine Grocers 
Association. This group 
‘worked to encourage a pre-
emptive strike in January, 
including sending letters to 
key legislators in Maine from 
constituents and retailers.  
The Eagle Team planned to 
create an ‘impact of cigarette 
tax increase booklet’ to be 
delivered to legislators by the 
Maine Grocers Association, 
bill which was 
attempting to raise 
tobacco tax by $1.50, 
rather than just $1.  
Furthermore, the 
additional revenue was 
directed towards the 
General Fund to 
balance the budget, 
rather than towards any 
health / tobacco control 
related activities). 
- In 2007, a bill which 
included a tobacco tax 
increase of $1 per pack, 
was defeated. 
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which focused on linking 
tobacco tax increases with 
crime, smuggling, negative 
financial impacts, and 
increased sales and Indian 
Reservations.  
- Organised phone banks that 
facilitated conversations with 
legislators, and organised a 
petition drive. They drafted 
form letters that retailers 
could send to their 
Representatives and 
provided those opposed to 
the bill with data concerning 
the potential impact on sales, 
as well as phone numbers 
they could use to contact 
legislators to express their 
opposition. 
- In 2001, the tobacco 
industry’s efforts were more 
low key: They recruited the 
New England Convenience 
Store Association to make 
calls, providing them with 
scripts; attempted to mobilise 
support through phone 
banks; and ‘mailed 
informational packets to 
retailers and consumers’. 
- In 2005, RJR responded to 
the tax proposals via a letter 
writing campaign. 
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Sullivan, 
Barnes and 
Glantz, 
2009[51] 
Not stated. 6   Aim: To keep taxes on 
tobacco low in South 
Carolina, US, and to prevent 
tobacco tax increases 
earmarked for healthcare. 
Context: Focuses on state 
level, legislative activities to 
increase tobacco taxes in 
South Carolina from the 
1970s until 2008 (though the 
time focus of this review 
means we have focused on 
data relating to 1985 
onwards). South Carolina is 
a tobacco growing state. 
Against a history of 
tobacco industry using 
traditional arguments 
against tobacco tax 
increases to oppose the 
bill (that they were unfair, 
socially regressive, would 
harm tobacco farmers, and 
increase interstate 
smuggling), in 2003, Sen. 
McConnell said that he 
would oppose a cigarette 
tax increase, for which it 
had been proposed the 
revenues would fund 
healthcare, because it 
would unfairly burden 
smokers with the 
responsibility of paying for 
Medicaid (tobacco industry 
provided funds for the 
Senator). 
- In 2008, tobacco industry 
argued that the bill would 
lead to a funding gap for 
programs funded by the 
revenue. 
- Claimed tax increase 
proposals were the result 
of specialist health 
interests. 
 
- In 2003, Sen. McConnell 
received $3,500 in campaign 
contributions from Philip 
Morris, Lorillard and RJR 
combined, and received a 
total of $4,900 between 1996 
and 2004 from tobacco 
manufacturers. 
- In 2006-08, groups with 
tobacco industry ties 
continued their ongoing 
efforts to get elected officials 
to sign no-tax increase 
pledges.  
- In 2006, the tobacco 
industry responded forcefully 
to the increased advocacy by 
the health groups to promote 
a tobacco tax. This included 
RJR spending $6,000 on an 
‘Axe the Tax’ event to launch 
their opposition campaign in 
2006. The event was held at 
a bar with live country music 
in West Columbia and 
featured scantily clad women 
and company representatives 
offering free cigarettes to 
smokers and free beer to 
non-smokers in exchange for 
signatures on a petition 
urging lawmakers not to 
increase the cigarette tax.  
- In 2008, the tobacco 
Successful: 
- Of the period of 
interest to this review 
(1985-2010), the 
tobacco industry 
appears to have been 
largely successful: 
- A 2003 bill proposing 
increase in tax by 53 
cents was defeated; 
- A 2006 bill proposing 
increase in tax by 30 
cents and then 40 cents 
two years later 
defeated; 
- A 2008 bill was 
defeated due to 
Governor’s veto and the 
Speaker’s opposition to 
Medicaid expansion.  
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industry used an independent 
third-party group called the 
‘South Carolina Association 
of Taxpayers’, with which it 
had a longstanding 
relationship, to conduct an 
advertising campaign against 
the bill. 
- In 2008, a postcard 
campaign used the common 
tobacco industry tactic of 
demonising the hospital 
industry to defeat tax 
increases, claiming that the 
‘hospital industry and 
insurance company special 
interests want Legislators to 
raise your taxes!’ 
Torrijos and 
Glantz, 
2005[52] 
Not stated. 5,6   Aim: To keep taxes on 
cigarettes and tobacco low in 
Montana, US. In the study 
period of this review, the 
study focuses specifically on 
the following proposals to 
increase tobacco taxes: 
- A1989 proposal to raise 
cigarette tax by 2 cents, from 
16 to 18 cents per pack; 
- A 1990 proposal to raise 
cigarette tax from 18 cents to 
43 cents per pack (modelled 
on California’s Proposition 
99); 
- Various bills in 2003. 
- In 1989, argued 
increased tax would cause 
declining sales, and thus 
reduced revenue, and that 
the cigarette tax was  
‘selective’ and unfair. Also 
claimed it would create 
costly and unnecessary 
bureaucracy and would 
‘continue the dangerous 
trend of government 
intrusion into people’s lives 
and personal decisions.’ 
- Argued it was regressive 
and that the initiative was 
an unwise use of state 
- Having unsuccessfully 
opposed a tobacco tax 
increase in 1983, the tobacco 
industry had already 
established a Tobacco Action 
Network (TAN). 
- In 1990, the tobacco 
industry funded front groups 
to oppose the proposed 
increase (‘Tobacco 
Consumers, Distributors & 
Producers Opposed to Unfair 
Tobacco Sales Taxes’). 
- The tobacco industry also 
hired local advertising 
agencies to manage the 
Largely unsuccessful: 
- The 1989 bill passed 
- The 1990 bill was 
defeated 
- Two bills in 2003 
passed (cigarette tax 
was initially increased 
from 18 cents to 70 
cents per pack and then 
by a further $1 to 
$1.70). 
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Some of these proposals 
included plans for 
earmarking the revenue for 
health programmes, 
including health care (but not 
tobacco control). 
Context: Study focuses on 
state level efforts to increase 
tobacco taxes in Montana, 
USA, between 1983 and 
2003. In the 1980s, these 
efforts were legislative, but 
from 1990 onwards popular 
votes were used.  
resources.  
- In 2003, the tobacco 
industry argued that excise 
taxes were already high 
and that the tobacco 
industry and smokers were 
paying an unfair share of 
taxes and that financial 
burden of health insurance 
and prescription drugs 
should be the 
responsibilities of everyone 
in Montana ‘and not just a 
selective few’.  
- Claimed large cigarette 
tax increases would lead to 
smuggling, cross-border 
and internet trade, without 
proper security against 
sales to minors. 
- In relation to later 
proposals in 2003, the 
tobacco industry argued 
that ‘excessive excise 
taxes’ could have 
unintended consequences, 
such as an increase in 
illegal reselling of 
cigarettes from lower tax 
states and the increased 
sale of counterfeit 
cigarettes. 
- Also claimed that the bill 
was unconstitutional. 
campaign against the tax; 
collected survey data to 
inform their campaign; made 
use of television, radio, and 
newspaper advertisements; 
sent brochures to businesses 
(emphasising potential 
negative economic impact of 
increase); and sent mailings 
to voters describing the 
cigarette tax as ‘a trap set by 
‘special interests’ to subsidize 
‘people who live in cities.’  
- Opposition campaign also 
tried to link the tobacco tax 
increase to other unpopular 
taxes (newly increased 
property tax). 
- Tried to persuade Governor 
to stop all public service 
announcements about 
tobacco in order to ensure 
that these messages were 
not interpreted as support by 
the Governor for the tax 
increase. 
- Tried to shift the focus of 
debates onto other issues 
instead of this tax. 
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Walbeek, 
2003[13] 
Not stated. 1   Aim: To prevent tobacco 
excise from increasing in 
South Africa. 
Context: Study focuses on 
tobacco tax legislative 
initiatives in South Africa 
(national level) during the 
1990s. 
- The Tobacco Institute of 
South Africa framed 
tobacco tax increases as 
‘discriminatory’, arguing 
that tobacco was already 
the most highly taxed 
consumer product. 
- Claimed that large tax 
increases would 
encourage smuggling and 
negatively impact on 
government revenue 
(despite the fact evidence 
indicated smuggling was 
not a significant issue for 
tobacco in South Africa at 
the time). 
- Finally, claimed that tax 
increases would lead to 
decreases in consumption, 
which would cause large 
numbers of workers to lose 
their jobs. 
- In 1996, the chairman of the 
Rembrandt Group, the 
country’s largest cigarette 
manufacturer, wrote an open 
letter to the Minister of Health 
in which he argued that 
smuggling was out of control, 
and that the government was 
losing revenue as a result.’ 
Canada was employed as a 
comparative example. 
- Study also claims that the 
tobacco industry disguises 
retail price increases behind 
well-publicised tax increases, 
which the author claims 
helped increase sales and, 
therefore, the profitability of 
the tobacco industry, whilst 
reducing the government’s 
ability to further increase 
tobacco taxes. 
Mixed: 
- Historically, the 
industry had been very 
successful in preventing 
tax increases (between 
the 1970s and the early 
1990s, the real price of 
cigarettes declined). 
- The tobacco industry 
lost influence when the 
ANC came to power in 
1994 and in June that 
year, the Minister of 
Finance announced that 
the government would 
increase the tax on 
tobacco products to 50 
per cent of the retail 
price. However, 
‘because of pressure 
exerted by the tobacco 
industry, the Minister of 
Finance increased the 
tax by only 25 per cent 
in 1994’.  
- The tax was increased 
in subsequent years 
and in 1997 the 50 per 
cent target was 
achieved. 
- However, tobacco tax 
in South Africa remains 
low by international 
standards. 
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Welle, 
Ibrahim and 
Glantz, 
2004[54] 
Unclear. 5,6   Aim: To keep taxes low in 
North Dakota, USA. In 
particular, within the period 
of relevance to this review, 
the study focuses on 
tobacco industry activity in 
relation to the following 
proposals for tax increases: 
- A 1985 proposal to 
increase cigarette tax to 26 
cents per pack; 
- A 1991 proposal to 
implement a partial tax 
increase of 29 cents per 
pack; 
- A 1993 proposal  increase 
cigarette tax by 15 cents; 
- A1995 proposal to increase 
cigarette tax by 1 cent to 
generate $1 million in 
revenue which would be 
earmarked to fund a 
program for nurses in public 
schools; 
- A 2003 proposal to 
increase cigarette tax by 35 
cents. 
Context: Focuses on 
legislative efforts to achieve 
tobacco tax increases at 
state level in North Dakota, 
US, from 1983- 2003. 
- In 1991, the tobacco 
industry claimed that 
Native American reserve 
shops (which had tax 
breaks) would have an 
increased incentive to sell 
cigarettes because of the 
increased price difference 
compared to other North 
Dakota retailers if tax 
increase went ahead. 
- Also claimed that if more 
consumers purchased 
cigarettes on reservations, 
there would be a related 
loss of tax revenue for the 
State. 
- Claimed smuggling was 
likely to increase. 
- In 2003, the tobacco 
industry claimed that the 
proposed cigarette tax 
increase would unfairly 
burden smokers with 
providing the funding for 
state programs, that the 
increases were unfair and 
selective for lower and 
moderate income 
Americans.  The tobacco 
industry also claimed the 
increase would lead to job 
losses (particularly in the 
retail/wholesale industry) 
The tobacco industry already 
had a history of fighting tax 
increases, having 
unsuccessfully opposed a 
proposal for a tax increase in 
1983.  Between 1985 and 
2003, the tobacco industry 
continued its strategy of using 
politically connected, well-
respected figures as 
lobbyists, including John 
Olson, a former Republican 
legislator, and Bob Hanson, a 
former state treasurer. 
- In 1991, the Tobacco 
Institute produced an action 
plan which outlined the 
resources needed to achieve 
their goals.   The action plan 
was divided into seven major 
categories of action: 
economic analysis/factsheet, 
legal memorandum, expert 
witness, coalition allies, 
tobacco industry grassroots 
mobilisation, company 
resources, public 
affairs/media resources and 
additional needs. The 
tobacco industry used 
grassroots campaigns to help 
promote arguments. 
- In 1995, the tobacco 
industry used front groups 
Largely successful: 
- The 1985 bill was 
passed by the House 
but was then defeated 
in the Senate 
- The 1991 bill was 
defeated 
- The 1993 bill passed 
- The 1995 bill was 
defeated 
- The 2003 bill was 
defeated 
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and encourage internet 
sales and other tax 
avoidance behaviours, 
which would lead to 
decreased tax revenue 
and poor enforcement of 
minimum wages. 
and business organisations 
with which it had contacts, 
including: the North Dakota 
Grocers Association, the 
North Dakota Retail and 
Petroleum Marketers 
Association, and the Greater 
North Dakota Association. 
Yerger & 
Malone, 
2002[55] 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents 
and relevant 
secondary data 
sources including 
newspaper and 
journal articles. 
1-3,5-7,9,10   Aim: To avoid any significant 
tobacco tax increases in the 
US. 
Context: Study focuses on 
exploring how and for what 
purposes the tobacco 
industry sought to establish 
and maintain relationships 
with African American 
leaders, from 1930s until 
1990s (although the aspects 
concerning tobacco tax 
issues relate to the second 
half of the 1980s). Considers 
efforts by the tobacco 
industry to prevent tobacco 
tax increases at state and 
federal level, in US.  Notes 
that during the late 1980s, 
the federal government was 
looking for ways to address 
its budget deficit and that 
increasing the federal excise 
tax on tobacco products was 
considered to be an option 
for addressing this. 
Argued excise taxes were 
regressive and 
disproportionately unfair, 
particularly to minorities. 
- African American groups 
with which the tobacco 
industry had ties were used 
as credible voices for 
opposing tobacco tax 
increases.  The 
Congressional Black Caucus 
(CBC) shifted its 1981 
support for a 10% increase in 
the tobacco excise tax to help 
restore funding for social 
programmes to a position 
opposing increasing tobacco 
excise taxes in 1984 (for 
undetermined reasons).The 
tobacco industry then sought 
to leverage the caucus’s 
changed position. 
- Many other African 
American groups were also 
identified as being willing to 
support this position. 
- CBC commissioned a task 
force to review the impact of 
excise taxes on the poor, 
blacks, and other minorities. 
The success of the 
tobacco industry in 
avoiding significant tax 
increases is not made 
clear in this study but 
the authors imply that it 
was successful in 
influencing the position 
on this issue of African 
American groups and 
leaders. 
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 The task force issued a 1987 
report, which was used to 
lobby politicians with (and 
which the tobacco industry 
helped promote). 
- Philip Morris distributed to 
50 major African American 
newspapers an op-ed piece 
apparently authored by 
James Hargrove, chair of the 
National Black Police 
Association, addressing ‘the 
inherent unfairness of excise 
taxes to minorities’ (notes the 
tobacco industry paid Mr. 
Hargrove and he often 
defended pro-tobacco 
positions). 
- The tobacco industry 
produced economic studies 
to support its claims about 
taxes. 
- The tobacco industry relied 
on support of Congress 
representatives who received 
tobacco industry money. 
Studies concerned with tobacco industry efforts to influence tobacco tax structures (though ** indicates that studies also discuss lobbying related to tobacco excise 
levels) 
Barnes & 
Glantz, 
2008**[23] 
Unclear. 5,6,8,9   Aims: To change the 
tobacco excise system from 
ad valorem to specific and to 
prevent taxes from getting 
too high. Suggests that the 
reason the tobacco industry 
- Hawai‛i is the only state 
with an ad valorem tax on 
cigarettes and it is one of 
the highest taxes in the 
country.  
- Hawaii's cigarette tax has 
- Use of lobbying (particularly 
Tobacco Institute lobbyists) 
- Drafting / influencing 
testimonies given to the Tax 
Review Commission. 
-  Using/funding third party 
Mixed:  
- The ad valorem tax 
was repealed in 1993, 
and the final tax level 
was lower than first 
proposed (but this was 
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wanted to achieve shift from 
ad valorem to specific 
taxation was because they 
believed ad valorem led to 
higher levels of taxation. 
Also suggests the industry 
was working to retain 
responsibility for tobacco 
taxation at State level. 
Context: Study focuses on 
legislative, state level 
activities in Hawai’i during 
the 1990s. 
advanced much more 
quickly than the average 
state cigarette tax. 
- This has contributed to a 
steep drop in sales. 
- An ad valorem tax system 
‘creates incentives to avoid 
or evade payment’. 
- The ad valorem tax 
deprives the Legislature of 
the responsibility to increase 
or decrease the tax as the 
ad valorem tax is based on 
the wholesale price which 
includes inflation, and 
transportation and 
warehousing costs.  
- Switching to a fixed rate 
would help avert tax erosion 
as smokers switch to lower 
quality and less expensive 
cigarettes. 
- Characterised a proposed 
tax increase as ‘punitive in 
nature and confiscatory’. 
- Claimed that higher taxes 
would lead to increased 
smuggling / illicit trade. 
groups, such as the Tax 
Foundation of Hawai’i. 
- Paying economists to testify 
before the Hawai’i Tax 
Review Commission (e.g. 
James Barney Marsh, a 
professor of economics at the 
University of Hawai‘I billed 
the Tobacco Institute $2,595 
for 3 hours of report 
preparation and 6 hours of 
testimony, including travel 
time from Honolulu to Maui). 
In his testimony, Marsh 
stated that an ad valorem tax 
system ‘creates incentives to 
avoid or evade payment,’ and 
advocated a specific tax with 
a tax stamp as more difficult 
to evade and easier to 
enforce. 
- Paper also mentions more 
general tobacco industry 
lobbying (not specifically tax 
related) including: using the 
media, public relations, front 
groups, industry allies, and 
financial contributions to 
legislators, individuals and 
political parties; funding 
lobbyists from small, well 
connected firms. 
higher than the 
industry had 
anticipated). 
- Subsequent tax 
increases were 
achieved, despite 
opposition, but 
revenue that was 
originally proposed to 
go into tobacco control 
programmes was 
diverted to other health 
care / medical streams 
(article notes: ‘No 
tobacco tax revenue is 
dedicated to tobacco 
control’ in Hawai’i). 
Gilmore & 
McKee, 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents 
1-3,5-7,9,10   Aim: Different tobacco 
companies were each 
- BAT argued the excise 
regimes it favoured would 
- BAT employed various 
arguments to suggest that it 
Not assessed in this 
study (at least not in 
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2004[57] and supplementary 
data from tobacco 
industry journals, 
newspapers, routine 
data, and other 
published reports. 
seeking to achieve excise 
structures that were 
favorable to their products. 
Context: Study focuses on 
nation-state level activities in 
Former Soviet Union 
countries, during the period 
between the late 1980s and 
2003, when several 
governments had committed 
to privatising state 
monopolies (preferably 
through closed deals), 
including tobacco. 
 
 
increase fiscal and excise 
revenues received by 
targeted governments (even 
when BAT was itself 
involved in tax evasion via 
smuggling and has a track 
record of lobbying for tax 
reductions, which have the 
potential to reduce 
revenues). 
was a better tobacco 
company to deal with than its 
competitors. This included 
presenting itself as a helpful 
and supportive corporation 
which could help ‘advise’ 
government on things like 
excise regimes. 
- BAT attempted to establish 
good political 
connections/contacts to 
promote these arguments, 
sometimes working via 
consultants. 
relation to tax issues). 
Gilmore, 
Collin, & 
Townsend, 
2007**[15] 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents, 
other documentary 
data and some 
interviews. 
1-7,9,10   Aim: BAT sought to: 
- introduce protective import 
taxes; 
- equalize excise on imports 
and domestic production; 
- ensure the proper control 
and collection of taxes, 
particularly on competitors' 
imports (e.g. through the 
introduction of a tax stamp 
system, from which BAT 
would hopefully be 
exempted) 
- achieve a reduction in the 
excise tax on cigarettes 
(even though levels were 
already low); 
- achieve the implementation 
- Argued against the 
imposition of high taxation 
levels on the basis that high 
levels would encourage 
smuggling (even though 
BAT was involved in 
smuggling). 
- Argued its excise system 
proposals would minimize 
smuggling and optimize 
government revenue (even 
though BAT internal docs 
indicate the driving force 
was to achieve the best 
possible market position for 
BAT and that the company 
was aware its 
recommendations perhaps 
- Lobbying of government 
officials responsible for 
taxation policy. 
- BAT offered to ‘help’ 
officials in charge of tobacco 
taxation, who were unsure of 
the issues involved and who 
were inexperienced. 
Effectively, BAT created ‘a 
symbiotic relationship 
between BAT and the 
Ministry of Finance.  
- BAT staff produced papers 
on smuggling, which fed into 
the above negotiations. 
- BAT bought up local TI to 
achieve market dominance 
and political influence. 
Successful: 
- BAT achieved a 
reduction of 
approximately 50% in 
the excise tax on 
cigarettes. 
- BAT achieved an 
excise system it 
believed would benefit 
its brands and 
disadvantage those of 
its competitors 
(particularly Philip 
Morris), which included 
the introduction of tax 
stamps in 1996, a 
licensing requirement 
for import and export, 
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of an excise system to 
benefit BAT’s brands and 
disadvantage those of its 
competitors (particularly 
Philip Morris). This involved 
a mixed excise system, 
which would ensure high-
end brands (such as 
Marlboro) were hit through 
maintaining an ad valorem 
tax on inputs, and which  
also involved having a 
specific element for imports 
to try to reduce cheaper 
imports (ideally, BAT hoped 
this level would not apply to 
BAT products). 
- an ad valorem domestic 
system of 40% on filtered 
and 25% on plain cigarettes. 
This was of benefit to BAT, 
which was focusing on the 
local filter-less brand Astra, 
and planned to later 
introduce other cheap local 
brands. 
- a requirement for a license 
to import and export 
cigarettes, as well as to 
provide wholesale and retail 
distribution. 
Context: Study focuses on 
nation-state level activities in 
Uzbekistan, a Former Soviet 
weren’t always the best deal 
for the government). 
as well as wholesale 
and retail distribution. 
- ‘The price of 
cigarettes in 
Uzbekistan is now the 
lowest of all countries 
in the World Health 
Organization's Europe 
region, including those 
with which it is 
economically 
comparable’. 
- Overall: ‘BAT 
thoroughly redesigned 
Uzbekistan's tobacco 
taxation system to 
advance corporate 
objectives’ (achieved 
all its objectives, bar 
one – which it still 
hoped to achieve at 
the end of the study). 
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Union country, during 1990s, 
following BAT’s acquisition 
of the state tobacco 
monopoly during 
privatisation. 
Gilmore, 
Radu-
Loghin, 
Zatushevski, 
& McKee, 
2005[58] 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents 
and supplementary 
data, such as 
newspapers. 
1-10   Aims: BAT sought to acquire 
a monopoly position (through 
an exclusive deal) in 
Moldova and then bolster its 
position by influencing 
excise rules so that they 
would ‘uniquely favour its 
products’ (which would 
encourage smokers to 
switch from filterless to more 
expensive filter brands, 
despite low incomes). 
- It hoped not to increase its 
market share to over 80% 
within 4 years, by ‘closing 
the market to external 
competition’ and undertaking 
marketing campaign. 
- As part of efforts to close 
the market to external 
competition, BAT wanted to 
use a system of Banderols. It 
also wanted to secure tax 
exemptions for BAT 
products. 
Context: Study focuses on 
nation-state level activities in 
Moldova, a Former Soviet 
Union country, during 1990s. 
No relevant information on 
this issue is provided by this 
study (focuses instead on 
arguments used in relation 
to privatisation). 
Not specified in relation to 
BAT’s tax related proposals 
(probably because 
privatisation did not proceed). 
Unsuccessful: 
- At the time this study 
was published, the 
Moldovan state 
tobacco companies 
had still not been 
privatised. 
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Authors note Moldova is 
Europe’s poorest country. 
Hammond 
and White, 
2001**[16] 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents. 
1   Aim: The primary goal of the 
tobacco companies was to 
delay and defeat proposals 
for a unified approach to 
raising tax increases across 
the Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries. A key issue for 
Philip Morris was that, short 
of defeating tax increases, it 
at least wanted to ensure 
that specific rather than ad 
valorem taxes were 
employed. 
Context: Study focuses on 
tobacco industry efforts to 
influence various policies 
(including, but not only, tax 
policies) through national-
state level legislative 
developments in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council 
countries, during 1980s and 
1990s. 
None highlighted. - Direct lobbying of policy-
makers; 
- Manipulated / used the 
media; 
- Philip Morris exploited the 
differences between various 
countries in the region to 
promote their favoured 
policies. 
- Located people from 
member states who would 
act as consultants on tax and 
other tobacco issues. 
- Lobbied key countries to 
increase the minimum level 
of specific (as opposed to ad 
valorem) tax when Finance 
Ministers in the region could 
not agree about increasing 
tobacco taxes. 
- Sought renewed discussion 
of the structure of any new 
tax (both as an end in itself 
and as a delaying tactic) 
- Sought support of US Trade 
Representative in relation to 
call for specific (rather than 
ad valorem) taxes and sought 
USA government support in 
enforcing preferable policies. 
Unclear: 
- In relation to 
changing excise 
structure: Philip Morris 
‘secured the 
endorsement of the 
specific duty concept 
by the Gulf Health 
Ministers Council’ but it 
is unclear if this 
change was 
implemented. 
- In relation to the tax 
increases, the authors 
claim that the tobacco 
industry delayed these 
increases but the 
evidence supporting 
this claim is unclear. 
Nakkash, 
2007**[17] 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents, 
1-6,8-10   Aims: Both BAT and Philip 
Morris sought to keep 
- BAT claimed its plan would 
‘afford some protection to 
NB as this study focuses on 
policy influence in Lebanon 
Largely successful 
(especially BAT): 
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plus secondary 
documentary sources 
and 20 semi-
structured interviews 
with key informants. 
tobacco taxes low. 
- The companies had 
different aims in relation to 
tobacco tax structures: Philip 
Morris sought to change the 
system to specific excise 
(circa early-mid 1980s). 
Whereas BAT wanted to 
avoid Philip Morris’s 
preferred structure & instead 
secure ‘a tax structure which 
would render a similar return 
on both premium and low 
priced imports’ (implying they 
preferred either a mixed 
system, with a significant 
element of ad valorem, or an 
ad valorem system). 
- BAT also wanted to prevent 
increases in import duties. 
Context: The study focuses 
on tobacco industry efforts to 
influence various policies 
(including, but not only, tax 
policies) at a national level in 
Lebanon, during 1980s, 
1990s and early 2000s. 
local manufacture; […] swell 
the government’s tax 
revenue [and]… […] 
improve balance of 
payments through import 
substitution/local value 
added.’ 
- A BAT study warned that 
‘significant and too frequent 
tax increases will encourage 
a resurgence of contraband 
on the one hand and 
discourage any outflow of 
goods from the market on 
the other.’ Tax reform, it was 
claimed, would ‘curb 
smuggling’ 
- BAT argued against the 
specific system Philip Morris 
supported by implying it 
could exacerbate smuggling 
and reduce the 
government’s revenue.  
- The tobacco industry 
argued reducing taxes could 
help reduce smuggling. 
more broadly, extensive 
tobacco industry tactics are 
discussed but this table 
focuses only on tactics that 
were clearly related to 
industry efforts to influence 
tobacco taxation policies. 
- Lobbying of key officials, 
e.g. BAT set out to ‘[p]repare 
lobby plan for the Minister of 
Finance, who BAT had 
access to via a consultant. 
- Says BAT plan for excise 
reform had support from IMF 
and implies BAT helped 
secure this support.  
- BAT appears to have 
been successful in 
influencing tax 
structure: ‘In May 
1995, Macleod 
reported an 
‘unconfirmed report 
that the Lebanese 
Regie has finally come 
down on the side of an 
ad valorem structure 
and has submitted a 
recommendation to the 
Ministry of Finance’ 
- But taxes were 
increased: ‘In April 
1999, tobacco taxes 
substantially increased 
from 54% to 90% plus 
an additional 48% as 
local consumption tax 
(total 138%).’ 
- However, the April 
1999 tax increase was 
later revoked, following 
claims that the rise 
resulted in further 
smuggling and losses 
to the Treasury.’ 
Szilagyi & 
Chapman, 
2003**[14] 
Analysis of tobacco 
industry documents 
and media coverage 
of the tax 
harmonisation issues. 
1-3,5-7,9,10   Aims: All tobacco industry 
interests appear to have 
wanted to keep tax 
increases low in Hungary 
(focuses on BAT and Philip 
- Tax increases will increase 
black market (this argument 
was used even when there 
was an awareness among 
tobacco companies that 
- Direct lobbying of officials. 
- Efforts to draw public 
attention to high tobacco 
taxes; 
- Use of economic impact 
Mixed: 
- Tobacco companies 
achieved significant 
political support as a 
result of their tax 
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This was 
supplemented by 
interviews with a 
finance ministry 
official and an inves-
tigative journalist.  
Morris). 
- However Philip Morris 
wanted to achieve a purely 
specific structure, whilst BAT 
wanted an ad valorem 
structure. 
- Philip Morris also sought to 
get rid of import duties, but 
believed that BAT was 
lobbying to retain them. 
- Other industry tax related 
aims included to prevent the 
introduction of tax stickers. 
Context: Study focuses on 
tobacco industry efforts to 
influence, tax legislation at a 
national level in Hungary, 
during the 1990s and early 
2000s, when the country 
was undergoing transition 
from a Communist, 
centralised economy to a 
free-market state and, 
subsequently, to a European 
Union member state. This 
involved, firstly, the 
privatisation of the state 
tobacco monopoly (in which 
Philip Morris acquired a 
majority stake) and, later, a 
requirement to comply with 
European Union tax policy 
requirements. 
smuggling was decreasing). 
- Publicly complained about 
the taxes imposed to them 
(whilst increasing their 
prices to ensure their 
profits). 
studies to support arguments 
(e.g. a study was produced 
by KPMG to support 
arguments against 
introducing EU tobacco tax 
excise levels at time of 
Hungary’s accession to EU, 
and Philip Morris 
commissioned a study from 
the Institute for Economic 
Research (Italy), on ‘the 
consequences of rapid 
alignment to the EU’s 
minimum tax on cigarettes in 
five accession countries’, 
including Hungary). Such 
reports were largely sent to 
relevant officials, although 
sometimes also reported in 
media; 
- Created a coalition against 
the proposed tax stickers 
(which tobacco companies 
would have had to pay for); 
- Attempted to ‘divert 
legislators’ attention’ away 
from proposed tax increases 
by offering the creation of a 
special fund to support 
tobacco growing in Hungary 
(to be levied via specific tax 
increases on cigarettes) 
related lobbying 
efforts. 
- However, they failed 
to prevent a tax 
increase, despite 
achieving significant 
political support on the 
issue. 
- In line with tobacco 
industry hopes, the tax 
burden on cigarettes in 
Hungary decreased in 
real terms between 
1990 and 1996 and the 
Hungarian budget had 
one of the lowest 
contributions from 
tobacco taxes in 
former communist bloc 
countries at the time of 
the study’s publication.  
- In1990s, tax 
increases in Hungary 
resulted in declining 
tobacco sales. 
- Implies industry 
helped shift 
government position 
on derogation period to 
meet EU tax 
harmonisation 
requirements, thereby 
delaying required tax 
increases. 
* The following critical appraisal (CA) criteria were used to appraise all of the included studies (the numbers listed for each study in the CA column in Table 1, 
above, indicate all of the criteria which the study met – where multiple publications related to the same study, the critical appraisal indicators relate to the collective 
publications, which means individual publications did not necessarily meet all of the criteria listed): 
1. How clear is/are the research question(s) and/or aim(s)? 
2. Was the methodology appropriate for addressing the stated aims of the study? 
3. Where applicable, was the recruitment/search strategy appropriate and/or was an adequate sample obtained to support the claims being made (i.e. was the 
data collection adequate and appropriate)? 
4. Were the methods of data analysis appropriate to the subject matter? 
5. Is the description of the findings provided in enough detail and depth to allow interpretation of the meanings and context of what is being studied? [Are data 
presented to support interpretations, etc?] 
6. Are the conclusions justified by the results? 
7. If applicable, are the theoretical developments justified by the results? 
8. Have the limitations of the study and their impact on the findings been considered? 
9. Do researchers discuss whether or how the findings can be transferred to other contexts or consider other ways in which the research may be used? 
10. If the answer to 9 is ‘yes’, are the suggestions appropriate, based on the research evidence presented? 
Search Strategy 
 
Search string: (tobacco OR cigar* OR snus OR ‘Philip Morris’ OR JTI OR ‘R.J. Reynolds’ OR 
Gallaher) AND (taxation OR tax OR excise OR price OR pricing) AND (polic* OR intervention OR 
lobb* OR influence) [NB tobacco company names were not included as a search term where they 
include the word tobacco, such as ‘British American Tobacco’ ‘Imperial Tobacco’, as publications 
using the word ‘tobacco’ were already covered by the search terms. The acronym ‘BAT’ was not 
used as a search term as it returned vast numbers of irrelevant studies.] 
 
Table of relevant databases and websites with explanation of how search was conducted 
and how many hits were returned 
Database/Website Name Notes on searching in this database Hits 
returned 
Business Source Premier 
 
Full string in ‘Title, abstract o keywords’ 397 
ECLAS (European Commission 
Library Catalogue) 
Full string in ‘All fields’ 36 
ESRC Society Today 
 
Full string in ‘ESRC Awards & Outputs’ 16 
European Sources Online 
 
Difficult to search – can’t use strings. So 
searched for ‘tobacco tax’ and ‘tobacco 
excise’ in keywords and also both in title 
9 
Index to Theses 
 
Full string in ‘All fields’ 21 
International Bibliography of the 
Social Sciences - IBSS 
 
Full string in ‘All fields’ 171 
Intute 
 
Full string in ‘All fields’ 3 
JSTOR 
 
Full string in ‘Abstract’ and then in ‘title’ 
(searching in all fields returned too many hits 
– over 34,000) 
70 + 18 
National Library for Health 
 
Full string in ‘Evidence Based Reviews’, 
‘Specialist Collections’ and ‘Books and 
Journals’ 
15 
Ovid databases (combining EconLit, 
EMBASE and Social Policy and 
Practice databases) 
 
Full string in abstract, then also in title 505 + 0 
Periodicals Archive Online 
 
Full string in ‘Article Title Keyword(s)’ 9 
PubMed 
 
Full string in Title/Abstract (too many 
returned in all text) 
366 
Web of Knowledge 
 
Full string in title, then in topic 23 + 688 
Reports on State Tobacco 
Policymaking 
(http://www.tobacco.ucsf.edu/states) 
Search string could not be applied so all 
studies published on this site were initially 
considered on the basis of their title and 
abstract 
38 
Total  2385 
 
A further 293 studies were located via searches of bibliographies (bringing the total number of 
potentially relevant publications identified to 2678). No further relevant studies were obtained via 
expert contacts (several recommendations were made but all had already been located via 
searches). 
 
Details of approach to systematic reviewing within the team 
KS first reviewed 22 studies; ES first reviewed 14.  Second reviewing, which was undertaken for a 
random selection of 15 (42%) studies, consisted of a second reviewer independently checking the 
first reviewer’s analysis. KS acted as second reviewer for 6 studies that ES first reviewed; ES acted 
as second reviewer for three studies that KS first reviewed; AG acted as second reviewer for three 
studies first reviewed by KS and three studies first reviewed by ES, which helped ensure 
consistency. AG was not involved in reviewing any studies she had been involved in authoring. 
 
 
 
 
